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INTRODUCTION
In January, 1997, the anguished mother of a depressed and bulimic
sixteen year-old girl, who had unsuccessfully attempted suicide,
placed a call to the director of the Vermont Mental Health
1
Association. Although both parents worked, and had purchased the
best coverage available to them through their employer-sponsored
Vermont Blue Cross/Blue Shield health benefits plan, the young girl
had already reached the $10,000 lifetime cap placed on mental
2
health benefits under the plan. Despite having spent thousands of
dollars out-of-pocket for additional care, the girl still needed more
medical treatment. Like hundreds of other families in Vermont, the
girl’s family faced a stark reality: doing everything to help their
3
daughter might ruin them financially.
Most Americans with private health care coverage receive coverage
4
through their employer, and most employer-sponsored plans offer
5
the beneficiaries some basic level of mental health care coverage.

1. See Mental Health Parity Legislation: Hearings of the Comm. on Health, Educ.,
Labor, and Pensions, 106th Cong. 83-84 (2000) (testimony of Ken Libertoff, Executive
Director of the Vermont Association of Mental Health) [hereinafter Libertoff
Testimony] (providing anecdotes from his experience in Vermont, where a state
mental health parity bill was passed in 1997), available at http://labor.senate.gov/
Hearing/may00hrg/051800wt/05180jmj/05190emk/domenici/rosen/wooldridge/a
llen/libertoff/libertoff.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2001).
2. See id. at 83 (explaining that although the medical plan provided $1 million
in lifetime benefits for “physical” illnesses, the plan severely restricted the amount of
money available for mental health benefits, including annual financial limits and
higher co-pays and deductibles).
3. See id. (reciting his experience fielding hundred of phone calls and visits
from people coping not only with seriously ill family members but also confronted
with the reality that they stood on the “brink of financial catastrophe”).
4. See Thomas G. McGuire, Predicting the Costs of Mental Health Benefits, 72
MILBANK Q. 3, 4 (1994) (stating that of the sixty precent of Americans with private
health insurance, employers constitute the largest source of private health care
coverage ).
5. See PAUL FRONSTIN ET AL., EBRI DATABOOK ON EMPLOYEE BENEFITS (Deborah
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Most of those plans, however, severely restrict the amount of coverage
6
provided for mental health services. Those plans typically limit the
7
number of inpatient hospital days and outpatient doctor visits and
impose higher cost sharing requirements on beneficiaries utilizing
mental health services than on beneficiaries requiring treatment for
8
physical illnesses. For many individuals suffering from less severe
mental illnesses, such as moderate depression or anxiety disorders,
these benefit structures are not overly burdensome, as a proper
medication regime coupled with limited inpatient hospitalization and
9
outpatient therapy can effectively control certain mental illnesses.
For individuals with a more severe mental illness, however, such
10
limitations on coverage can prove disastrous.
Beneficiaries who
11
exhaust their coverage often are left without meaningful recourse,

Holmes et al., 4th ed. 1997) (noting that some level of mental health coverage is
provided to over ninety percent of employees participating in employer-sponsored
health plans).
6. See Sharon Bee & Mary Jo Gibson, Mental Health Parity: An Overview of Recent
Legislation, AARP Public Policy Institute Research Summary, 1 (1998), at
http://research.aarp.org/health/fs69_mental.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2001)
(explaining that while indemnity plans typically provided $1 million in overall health
care coverage, the media lifetime limit for mental health care coverage is only
$40,000).
7. See id. at n.3 (citing the 1998 study by the Hay Group to assert that forty-eight
percent of all health plans limited the number of outpatient visits, and eighty-six
percent limited inpatient hospital care).
8. See id. (relying upon the Hay Group’s analysis to conclude that forty percent
of all health plans, including indemnity and managed care plans, imposed annual
dollar limits on outpatient psychiatric care).
9. See American Medical Association Council on Long Range Planning and
Development, The Future of Psychiatry, 264 JAMA 2542, 2543 (1990) [hereinafter JAMA
Report] (discussing how the advent of numerous new medications, such as Prozac
and other anti-depressants, as well as other therapies, have made treatment more
effective). See also Harold Alan Pincus et al., Prescribing Trends in Psychotropic
Medications: Primary Care, Psychiatry, and Other Medical Specialties, 279 JAMA 526, 531
(1998) (discussing the emergence and wide-ranging prescription of new drugs
helping treat a variety of ailments such as anxiety and depression without the
negative side effects of older medications).
10. See 141 CONG. REC. 3001 (1995) (statement of Sen. Domenici) [hereinafter
Domenici Statement] (charging that failure to provide equal and adequate
treatment to the mentally ill results in an escalation of symptoms, pushing the
mentally ill to the “margins of society”); cf. H.R. 217-Homeless Housing Programs
Consolidation and Flexibility Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Hous. and Cmty.
Opportunity of the Comm. on Banking and Fin. Servs., 105th Cong. 44 (1997) (testimony
of Dr. E. Fuller Torrey, M.D., Research Psychiatrist, Neuroscience Center, National
Institute of Mental Health) [hereinafter Fuller Testimony] (stating that “[t]he
second largest cause of homelessness is severe psychiatric illness, specifically
schizophrenia and manic-depressive illness (bipolar disorder) . . . [and] studies
consistently have found that between 25 and 45 percent of homeless individuals have
a severe psychiatric disorder, not including those with a primary diagnosis of
substance abuse.”), available at http://www.house.gov/banking/3597torr.htm (last
visited Sept. 15, 2001).
11. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) § 502(a), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(a)(1)(B) (1994) (limiting ERISA plan beneficiaries’ legal recourse to “actions
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and their mental illnesses progress unchecked, disrupting their lives
12
in fundamental ways.
Mental health advocates and consumers have long decried this
situation, seeking on numerous fronts to eliminate unequal
13
treatment between mental and physical illness. Due in part to their
efforts, legislation prohibiting disparate treatment of mental illness
has been considered in nearly every state legislature in the United
14
States, and similar bills have been introduced in both Houses of
15
Congress in recent years. Mental health consumers and advocates
also have sought relief in numerous federal courts throughout the
16
country, seeking a judicial declaration that unequal benefits are
17
discriminatory and illegal.
The results of those efforts, however, fall far short of systemic,
18
Although a solid majority of states have
comprehensive reform.
19
passed some form of protection for the mentally ill, this protection

to recover benefits due under the plan; actions to enforce benefits due under the
plan; or clarification of rights to future benefits.”).
12. See supra note 10 and accompanying parentheticals (detailing the results of
untreated mental illness).
13. See discussion infra Parts I.B-C, III (discussing parity proponents’ efforts in
state legislatures, Congress, and federal courts).
14. See discussion infra Part I.B (detailing the parity measures considered and
passed by state legislatures); see also Maria A. Morrison, Changing Perceptions of Mental
Illness and the Emergence of Expansive Mental Health Parity Legislation, 45 S.D. L. REV. 8,
14 n.61 (2000) (discussing state parity laws and providing overview of pending state
and federal legislative efforts, in addition to surveying recent court cases that seek
parity for mental health benefits). See generally United States General Accounting
Office, Mental Health Parity Act: Despite New Federal Standards, Mental Health
Benefits Remain Limited, GAO/HEHS-00-95 (2000) [hereinafter GAO Letter
Report] (reporting on compliance with Mental Health Parity Act of 1996 and
providing thorough examination of state parity law), available at http://www.access.
gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aces160.shtml (last visited Sept. 15, 2001).
15. See The Equitable Health Care for Severe Mental Illness Act of 1995, S. 298,
104th Cong. § 4 (1995) (mandating nondiscriminatory and equitable health care
coverage for persons with severe mental illness); see also Mental Health and
Substance Abuse Parity Amendments of 1998, H.R. 3568, 105th Cong. § 2 (1998)
(prohibiting imposition of “treatment limitations or financial requirements” on
mental health care benefits if similar restrictions also have not been applied to
“coverage of medical and surgical benefits in comparable settings (including
inpatient and outpatient settings).”); Mental Health Equitable Treatment Act of
1999, S. 796, 106th Cong. § 2 (1999) (prohibiting lesser coverage for inpatient
hospital days and outpatient doctor visits, and providing full parity in benefits for
individuals suffering from “severe mental illness,” i.e. those that are “biologically
based.”).
16. See infra text accompanying note 169 (observing that mental parity benefit
cases have been argued in front of the Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth,
Tenth and the District of Columbia Circuits).
17. See discussion infra Part III (discussing court challenges to unequal treatment
brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act).
18. See discussion infra Part I.B-C (concerning the limitations of both state and
federal parity measures).
19. See GAO Letter Report, supra note 14, at 8 (stating that twenty-nine states
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20

is limited in several important ways. Similarly, although Congress
21
passed mental health parity legislation in 1996, its scope and reach
22
also are strictly circumscribed. Further, legal challenges to unequal
treatment have been largely futile, with numerous federal courts
across the country unanimously holding that lesser coverage for
mental illnesses in health and disability benefits is neither
23
discriminatory nor illegal.
Accordingly, the most important and
enduring goal of mental health advocates and consumers remains
unfulfilled: that equal access to services and benefits would allow
people suffering from mental illness to lead “normal” productive lives
24
in society like any other citizen.

have parity laws more comprehensive than that required by the Mental Health Parity
Act of 1996). Sixteen of these states require full parity in all benefit categories and in
all plans sold. See id. While six states parallel the 1996 Mental Health Parity Act
(“MHPA”), eight states and the District of Columbia have laws requiring more
limited benefits, and the laws of seven states fail to address mental health benefits.
See id.
20. See discussion infra Part I.B (discussing the limitations of state-passed parity
measures, especially in relation to ERISA preemption of state regulation).
21. See Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-204, § 712, 110 Stat.
2944, 2945-47 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1185a (1994 and Supp. IV 1998)) [hereinafter
1996 MHPA] (providing parity for annual and lifetime aggregate spending caps
between mental and physical illness).
22. See id.
23. See EEOC v. Staten Island Sav. Bank, 207 F.3d 144, 149-50 (2d Cir. 2000)
(refusing to extend ADA protections to unequal long-term disability benefits for
mental and physical disabilities because different treatment is “a nearly universal
practice inherent in the insurance industry”, and, had Congress intended to reach
this disparity with the ADA, it was have explicitly stated so); Weyer v. Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 2000) (unsuccessfully
challenging lesser benefits provided for disability attributable to severe depression
than those provided for physical disabilities); Kimber v. Thiokol Corp., 196 F.3d
1092, 1102 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that the ADA does not bar employers from
utilizing long-term disability benefit plans that differentiate between physical and
mental disabilities in the provision of care); Lewis v. Kmart Corp., 180 F.3d 166, 172
(4th Cir. 1999) (overruling a district court decision that held lower long-term
disability coverage for severe depression constituted a violation of the ADA); Ford v.
Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 608 (3d Cir. 1998) (declaring that disparity
between mental and physical disability benefits does not violate ADA and dismissing
plaintiff’s discrimination claim); Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1015
(6th Cir. 1997) (denying relief in a claim virtually indistinguishable from Weyer and
explaining that ADA only prohibits discrimination between the disabled and nondisabled rather than between the mentally and physically ill); EEOC v. CNA Ins. Co.,
96 F.3d 1039, 1045 (7th Cir. 1996) (barring a disabled employee’s ADA claim
stemming from lesser coverage for severe depression and bi-polar disorder in longterm disability benefits); Modderno v. King, 82 F.3d 1059, 1064-65 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(rejecting the claim that a $75,000 lifetime cap on mental health benefits violated
the Rehabilitation Act).
24. See Domenici Statement, supra note 10, at 3002 (arguing that individuals
suffering from mental illness could, given adequate medical treatment and
behavioral therapy, “lead a life as normal as yours or mine.”); see also 142 CONG. REC.
S9292 (daily ed. July 31, 1996) (statements of Sen. Domenici after the Conference
Committee rejected the original Senate parity amendment) (urging Senate
Committee on Labor, Health and Human Services to reconsider mental health parity
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Despite these legislative and judicial impediments, opportunities
still exist in both Congress and the federal courts for those seeking
equal treatment between mental and physical illness. This Comment
addresses these opportunities, promoting a dual-track strategy for
attaining equal treatment in health care benefits for the mentally ill.
Specifically, this Comment recommends that mental health parity
25
legislation currently being considered by Congress, S. 543, should
be adopted to achieve parity in a manner designed to expand access
to more comprehensive services while simultaneously controlling
26
and/or reducing the associated costs.
Second, this Comment
proposes a strategy for expanding legal, employment-based
protections for individuals with mental illnesses under the Americans
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Although the federal courts have
demurred from making a blanket declaration that unequal benefits
27
are illegal under the ADA, by focusing on a “reasonable
accommodation” analysis under Title I of the ADA, a viable rationale
28
for a case-specific solution emerges.
Part I of this Comment briefly examines the background and
sociological aspects of unequal medical coverage for mental illness,
and discusses the legislative history of parity in state legislatures and
Congress. Part II surveys current parity legislation and asserts that it

legislation because “parity . . . will say to the 5 million severely mentally ill Americans
and their families that they are not going to be treated any longer like second-rate, if
not third rate, citizens.”).
25. See The Mental Health Equitable Treatment Act of 2001, S. 543, 107th Cong.
(2001) (amending the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 by
prohibiting “any treatment limitations or financial requirements with respect to the
coverage of benefits for mental illnesses unless comparable treatment limitations or
financial requirements are imposed on medical and surgical benefits”), available at
http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aces160.shtml (last visited Sept. 15, 2001).
S. 543 was introduced on March 15, 2001, and referred to the Senate Health,
Education, Labor and Pensions (“HELP”) Committee. See 147 CONG. REC. S2395-95
(daily ed. Mar. 15, 2001). On July 11, 2001, the HELP Committee conducted
hearings, the marked-up version was reported to the Senate on September 6, 2001.
See 147 CONG. REC. S9197 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 2001). On October 30, 2001, Senators
Domenici and Wellstone offered S. 543 as an amendment to the Departments of
Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act (“Labor-HHS Approps”), where it was accepted on a voice vote.
See 147 CONG. REC. S11165-85, S11216-17 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 2001). On November 6,
2001, the Senate passed their version of Labor-HHS Approps, containing S. 543’s
provisions. See H.R. 3061 (as engrossed in Senate), Title VII—Mental Health Equity,
S11458-75 (daily ed. Nov. 6, 2001). The House version of Labor-HHS Approps
contains no such provision, so the fate of S. 543 remains largely in the hands of the
Labor-HHS Conference Appointees.
26. See id.
27. See discussion infra Part III (surveying federal appellate court decisions
denying relief in cases challenging unequal benefits between mental and physical
illness).
28. See discussion infra Part IV.C (covering the notion of “reasonable
accommodation” and related ADA precedent).
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is a properly structured and necessary measure in the battle for full
and equal coverage. Part III examines the important legal challenges
to unequal coverage for mental illness and summarizes the courts’
decisions. Finally, Part IV suggests an alternative, individualized
strategy for bringing unequal coverage under the purview of Title I of
the ADA through the ADA’s “reasonable accommodation” provisions.
Part IV also enumerates the possible tests and impediments such a
strategy would encounter, and applies the “reasonable
accommodation” analysis to a potential real-world scenario.
The legislative and judicial approaches are independent but
complimentary. Although neither approach represents a panacea for
the problem of unequal coverage, both approaches seek to advance
29
legal protections for the mentally ill. These approaches serve to
buttress the arguments that: (1) those suffering from mental illness
30
can receive effective medical treatment; (2) given the proper
treatment, individuals living with a mental illness can lead “normal,”
31
productive lives; and (3) providing effective and adequate mental
32
health care treatment would not be prohibitively expensive.
I.

Background

A. Scientific Progress Versus Social Preconception
Historically, individuals with a mental illness have been treated
33
with contempt, fear, and cruelty. Lacking a medical explanation for
an individual’s strange behavior, societies often concluded that
mental illness stemmed from parental misdeeds, demonic possession,
34
or simply deficient character. Even well into the 20th Century, the

29. See discussion infra Parts II and IV (discussing how legislation and targeted
litigation would advance the goal of equal treatment for Americans with a mental
illness).
30. See Domenici Statement, supra note 10, at 3002-03 (describing treatment
success rates for mental illness). Treatment for bipolar disorder has an eighty
percent success rate; schizophrenia, a sixty percent success rate; and major
depression, a sixty-five percent success rate. See id. at 3002.
31. See id. at 3002 (stating that proper medical treatment can enable an
individual, who suffers from mental illness, to lead a “normal” life).
32. See discussion infra Parts I.D and II.A (covering opposition cost arguments
and citing studies demonstrating that mental health parity measures do not lead to
“runaway” health insurance costs).
33. See Domenici Statement, supra note 10, at 3001 (providing examples of the
often brutal measures taken against the mentally ill in the past).
34. See id. See generally Alison Bass, Stigma Against Mental Illness Persists Despite New
Research, HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 16, 1992, at 3 (referring to the tendency in Western
culture to ostracize and abandon individuals with a mental illnesses because “AngloAmerican culture places such a high premium on individual autonomy and
willpower [sic] that . . . people have trouble understanding why someone with
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mentally ill were institutionalized, imprisoned, and/or forcibly
35
sterilized. In the last few decades, however, medical science has
made dramatic breakthroughs in understanding, diagnosing, and
36
treating mental illness. Of pivotal importance is the recognition
that many mental illnesses have both physiological and biological
causes, blurring the historically sharp distinction between mental and
37
physical illnesses.
Such discoveries consequently have helped to
38
dispel much of the mystery and stigma surrounding mental illnesses.
Unfortunately, however, old habits die hard, and despite a relatively
enlightened medical perspective on the causes of mental illness,
society continues to harbor a deeply-held suspicion of both mental
39
illnesses and the mentally ill.
Nowhere is the gap between science and society more pronounced
40
than in health benefit coverage for mental illness. Despite medical
41
evidence that mental illnesses are partly physical in origin, insurers
and group health plans still separate mental illness from other

schizophrenia or profound depression cannot simply will himself to recover.”);
STEPHEN M. STAHL, ESSENTIAL PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY: NEUROSCIENTIFIC BASIS AND
CLINICAL APPLICATIONS 100 (1998) (citing surveys showing that seventy-one percent
of Americans believe mental illness stems from emotional weakness, sixty-five percent
attribute it to bad parenting and forty-five percent think mental illness is the fault of
the victim and that mental illness can be “willed away”).
35. See discussion infra Part I.A (discussing the relation of mental illness to
homelessness and imprisonment); see also Domenici Statement, supra note 10, at
3001 (stating that as late as 1972 the mentally ill of some states were sterilized
without their consent or knowledge).
36. See Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Labor Health & Human Servs., Educ. &
Related Agencies of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 104th Cong. 371 (1996)
(statement of Dr. Stephen E. Hyman, Director, Nat’l Inst. of Mental Health, Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs.) [hereinafter Hyman Testimony] (describing the progress of
the medical community in stating that in previous years a severe mental illness
spelled “a life sentence” whereas today, the medical profession is “crackling with new
hope because new medications ha[ve] revolutionized [the] clinical practice” and the
study of mental disorders).
37. See id. at 373 (voicing “widespread consensus that mental illnesses are just as
real, as medically valid, as other brain disorders”); see also id. at 375 (further
emphasizing the advancements of medical research into mental illnesses and
explaining that “the accumulating weight of the evidence . . . demonstrates that
mental disorders are brain diseases.”) (emphasis in original).
38. See Domenici Statement, supra note 10, at 3002 (lauding the increased level
of public understanding of mental illness).
39. See STAHL, supra note 34, at 100 (listing common social misconceptions of
mental illness).
40. See Bee & Gibson, supra note 6 (detailing common inequalities in health care
coverage between physical and mental illnesses); see also Domenici Statement, supra
note 10, at 3002 (noting that only two percent of Americans with private health
insurance have health care coverage that provides mental health benefits equal to
those provided for physical illnesses).
41. See Hyman Testimony, supra note 36, at 375-76 (discussing pertinent
scientific, biological and genetic evidence linking mental illnesses to brain disorders
by citing, inter alia, abnormal cerebral ventricles and under-developed nerve cells in
brains of schizophrenics).
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categories of illnesses, and provide the mentally ill less health
42
Typically, this inequality
insurance coverage and treatment.
manifests itself in lower overall financial limits for mental health
43
44
benefits, higher co-payments and deductibles, and fewer covered
45
The
inpatient hospital days and outpatient doctor visits.
consequences of these inequalities include prematurely exhausted
46
47
benefits, and exacerbation of the underlying illness and symptoms,
48
49
often leading to homelessness or imprisonment.
Rather than waiting for insurers to close the gap by instituting
parity on their own accord, mental health consumers and advocates
50
have focused on correcting this disparity through the legal process.
Accordingly, advocates and consumers have turned to their elected

42. See supra note 10 (discussing the different insurance treatment of mental
illness).
43. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text (describing dramatic financial
disparity between physical and mental health care coverage).
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text (providing example of a mentally
ill teenager from Vermont who, by age 16, had already reached the lifetime cap on
mental health benefits according to the insurance plan); see also David Satcher, M.D.,
Ph.D., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Mental Health: A Report of the Surgeon
General, Surgeon General’s Preface (containing the statement of the Surgeon
General referring generally to inadequate mental health benefits), available at
http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/mentalhealth/home.html (last visited Nov.
5, 2001).
47. See Domenici Statement, supra note 10, at 3002 (criticizing denial of medical
treatment to the mentally ill because “problems associated with nontreatment will
continue to escalate,” causing further marginalization of those suffering from mental
illness).
48. Fuller Testimony, supra note 10, at 44 (estimating that in 1997 there were
150,000 homeless with severe psychiatric disabilities nationwide and predicting that
figure will continue to climb).
49. See Fox Butterfield, Prisons Replace Hospitals for the Nation’s Mentally Ill, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 5, 1998, at A1 (analyzing “criminalization of the mentally ill” and
reporting on a 1998 estimation by the U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice
Statistics, that ten percent of all inmates in state and federal prisons, or
approximately 200,000 prisoners, are severely mentally ill). Most of these mentally ill
inmates commit minor infractions, such as disturbing the peace or vagrancy. Others
commit no infraction, but are jailed on “mercy” arrests, where authorities feel they
have no other option. See id. See also The Mentally Ill in Jail, National Association of
Counties Fact Sheets (June 2001) (estimating that, of the ten million people entering
county jails each year, nearly sixteen percent are suffering from mental illness),
available at http://www.naco.org/leg/facts/01mentallyill.cfm (last visited Sept. 15,
2001). See generally Mental Illness in U.S. Jails: Diverting the Nonviolent, Low-Level
Offender, Center on Crime, Communities, & Culture, Open Society Institute,
Research Brief, No. 1, Nov. 1996 (asserting that the number of mentally ill
individuals admitted into U.S. jails annually is nearly eight times the number of
patients admitted into state mental hospitals), available at http://www.soros.org/
crime/research_brief_1.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2001). Of the jails surveyed,
nearly one-third reported having admitted mentally ill individuals against whom no
criminal charges had been filed. See id.
50. See discussion infra Parts I.B-C, II and III (covering legislative and court
efforts to achieve mental health benefits parity).
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representatives, seeking to legislatively prohibit unequal coverage.

51

B. State Legislatures
For over a decade, state legislatures across the country have
52
considered mental health parity measures, with a majority of states
53
passing laws providing some protection for the mentally ill.
However, despite this apparently broad-ranging embrace of mental
54
health coverage, vast disparities in coverage requirements exist
55
between states, and only a minority of states require coverage for
mental illness that can truly be described as equal to coverage of
56
physical ailments.
57
In those states requiring full parity, the actual population to
which these mandates apply is severely limited by the Employee
58
Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) of 1974. ERISA is a far59
reaching federal regulatory regime designed to create nation-wide

51. See discussion infra Part I.B-C (analyzing state and federal legislative action
toward mental health parity).
52. See GAO Letter Report, supra note 14, at 6 (stating that during the past
decade, a majority of states have enacted mental health coverage legislation).
53. See id. at 8 (summarizing a National Conference of State Legislatures’
(NCSL) Health Policy Tracking Service report that forty-three states and the District
of Columbia have mental health coverage laws in place, though with differing
coverage requirements). Twenty-nine states have parity laws more comprehensive
than that required by the Mental Health Parity Act of 1996 (MHPA), with sixteen
states requiring full parity in all benefit categories and in all plans sold; six states
parallel the MHPA; and eight states and the District of Columbia have laws requiring
more limited benefits. See id. Only Alabama, Idaho, Iowa, Michigan, Oregon, Utah
and Wyoming are without a corresponding law. See id. California, the District of
Columbia, Illinois, Massachusetts, Mississippi, North Dakota, Ohio, Washington and
Wisconsin have more limited parity laws. See id. Alaska, Arizona, Florida, New
Mexico, South Carolina, West Virginia, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota and
Missouri meet the requirements of Federal law. See id. Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont and Virginia exceed the
requirements of Federal law.
54. See id. (noting that forty-three states and the District of Columbia have
instituted mental health coverage laws).
55. See id. (recognizing that twenty-nine states have parity laws more
comprehensive than that required by the Mental Health Parity Act of 1996 (MHPA),
with sixteen states requiring full parity in all benefit categories and in all plans sold;
six states parallel the MHPA; and eight states and the District of Columbia have laws
requiring more limited benefits). See id.
56. See supra note 54 (listing the sixteen states requiring full parity in benefit
categories and in all plans sold).
57. See supra note 54 (listing the states requiring full parity).
58. See ERISA, § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994) (stating that ERISA
supersedes all state laws that relate to any employee benefit plan, thus preempting
state-mandated laws).
59. See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 58 (1990) (stating that “[t]he preemption clause [of ERISA] is conspicuous for its breadth. It establishes as an area of
exclusive federal concern the subject of every state law that ‘relate[s] to’ an employee
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ERISA
stability and uniformity in employee benefit plans.
specifically preempts state-mandated benefit laws by “supersed[ing]
any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to
61
any employee benefit plan.” As of 1998, almost forty percent of
Americans under age sixty-five in private group health insurance
plans, or approximately forty-eight million people, were in ERISA
62
plans not subject to state-level regulation.
Courts have held that ERISA preempts many state common law
63
actions against covered health plans. In Tolton v. American Biodyne,
64
Inc., a suicide victim’s estate sued several doctors and the CIGNA
Health Plan of Ohio (“CIGNA”) for wrongful death, improper refusal
65
to authorize benefits, medical malpractice, and insurance bad faith.
The Sixth Circuit, reasoning that “varying state causes of action . . .
66
would pose an obstacle to the purposes and objectives of Congress,”

benefit plan governed by ERISA.”).
60. See N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
514 U.S. 645, 656-57 (1995) (explaining that § 514 indicates Congress’ intent to
regulate employee welfare benefits plans as a federal concern).
[ERISA] ensure[d] that plans and plan sponsors would be subject to a
uniform body of benefits law; the goal was to minimize the administrative
and financial burden of complying with conflicting directives among States
or between States and the Federal Government . . . [preventing] the
potential for conflict in substantive law . . . requiring the tailoring of plans
and employer conduct to the peculiarities of the law of each jurisdiction.
Id. at 656-57 (quoting Ingersoll-rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142 (1990)).
61. ERISA, § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994). See also Tolton v. Am. Biodyne,
Inc., 48 F.3d 937, 941-42 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating that ERISA was intended to replace
the “patchwork scheme of state regulation of employee benefit plans with a uniform
set of federal regulations”).
62. See Implications of ERISA for Health Benefits and the Number of Self-Funded ERISA
Plans, Employee Benefit Research Institute, Issue Brief (Jan., 1998) (noting that the
U.S. General Accounting office found that forty-four million individuals were
enrolled in self-funded ERISA plans in 1993 representing an increase of five million
since 1989), available at http://www.ebri.org/ibex/ib193.htm (last visited Sept. 15,
2001). However, the ability of states to mandate certain levels of mental health
coverage for insurance companies offering plans within state boundaries has been
upheld. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 725 (1985)
(upholding a Massachusetts state law requiring “insurance plans” offering policies in
the state to provide a minimum level of mental health benefits). In Metropolitan Life,
the Supreme Court found that the Massachusetts mandate applied to “insured plans”
(i.e. the Court was cognizant that the decision would result in a differentiation
between insured and uninsured plans), and that the state law was therefore not
preempted by ERISA, which allows traditional state regulation of insurance
companies. See id. at 747.
63. See discussion infra Part I.B (explaining how ERISA preemption limits the
reach of state parity laws).
64. 48 F.3d 937 (6th Cir. 1995).
65. See Tolton, 48 F.3d at 942 (“Plaintiff’s stated claims . . . all arise from
[defendant’s] refusal to authorize psychiatric benefits . . . .”).
66. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 52 (1987). Pilot stated that “[t]he
policy choices reflected in the inclusion of certain remedies and the exclusion of
others under the federal scheme would be completely undermined if ERISA-plan
participants and beneficiaries were free to obtain remedies under state law that
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held that the plaintiff’s state claims were preempted by ERISA. The
plain effect of ERISA preemption limits the beneficiary’s remedies to
those provided in ERISA § 502(a), specifically: (1) actions to recover
68
benefits due under the plan; (2) actions to enforce participant’s
69
rights under the plan; or (3) actions to clarify the right to future
70
benefits. Subsequently, “one consequence of ERISA preemption . . .
is that plan beneficiaries bringing certain types of actions—such as
71
wrongful death—may be left without meaningful remedy.”
Therefore, if the mentally ill are to acquire a “meaningful remedy” to
health benefit inequality, federal law must lead the way.
C. Congress
72

Due to the practical limitations of state-passed parity law, the need
for a federal parity law reaching self-insured ERISA health benefit
plans has become acute. In the early 1990s, Congress began
concerted efforts to pass a federal law eliminating inequalities in
73
coverage for mental illness. In 1992, Senators Pete V. Domenici (RNM) and Paul Wellstone (D-Minn.) introduced S. 2696, “The
74
Equitable Health Care for Severe Mental Illness Act of 1992.” The
Act required employer-sponsored group health plans to provide
75
coverage for “severe mental illness” in a non-discriminatory
76
Although this legislation garnered considerable
manner.

Congress rejected in ERISA.” Id. at 54.
67. See Tolton, 48 F.3d at 941-43.
68. See ERISA, § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1994).
69. See id. (stating that, “[a] civil action may be brought by a participant or
beneficiary . . . to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan . . . .”).
70. See id.
71. Tolton v. Am. Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937, 943 (6th Cir. 1995).
72. See discussion supra Part I.B (discussing the ERISA’s limitations).
73. See Equitable Health Care for Severe Mental Illness Act of 1992, 138 CONG.
REC. S6490 (daily ed. May 12, 1992) (statement of Sen. Domenici) (stating that the
bill should serve as a model mental health benefits plan and additionally should
place Congress on notice to treat mental health issue with the same deference as
traditional physical illnesses).
74. See id. (urging that mental health benefits should not be left “off the table”
merely due to cost concerns).
75. See S. 2696, 102d Cong. § 3 (1992) (requiring that equal coverage be
extended to “severe mental illness,” but not defining what specific illnesses or
diagnoses would qualify as “severe”).
76. See id. § 4.
To be considered non-discriminatory and equitable under this Act, health
coverage shall cover services that are essential to the effective treatment of
severe mental illness in a manner that (1) is not more restrictive than
coverage provided for other major physical illnesses; (2) provides adequate
financial protection to the person requiring the medical treatment for a
severe mental illness; and (3) is consistent with effective and common
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attention, and helped galvanize the mental health community, the
legislation ultimately died in the 102d Congress without further
79
action. The 1992 bill did, however, signal the first salvo in what has
80
become an ongoing, annual legislative battle.
In 1996, the combined efforts of dedicated legislators and
advocates paid dividends when Congress passed the “Mental Health
81
Parity Act of 1996” (“1996 MHPA”).
Although the federal law
82
signified a breakthrough for advocates and consumers, the 1996
83
MHPA actually offers only limited protection for the mentally ill.
The 1996 MHPA requires a group health plan offering a mental
health benefit in conjunction with medical/surgical benefit to
provide equality for any annual or lifetime aggregate spending caps
imposed within the plan, i.e. the same amount of money must be
equally available under both benefit categories for both mental and
84
physical illness.
However, the 1996 MHPA fails to: (1) require

methods of controlling health care costs for other major physical illnesses.
Id.
77. See Brian D. Shannon, Paving the Path to Parity in Health Insurance Coverage for
Mental Illness: New Law or Merely Good Intentions?, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 63, 64 (1997)
(stating that the 1996 MHPA “generated a substantial debate about the role of
insurance with respect to mental health care, in general, as well as the treatment of
serious mental illness, and the measure served to place the issue before the nation’s
citizens.”).
78. See id. (referring to further anticipated advocacy for parity).
79. See S. 2696, 102d Cong. (1992).
80. See The Equitable Health Care for Severe Mental Illness Act of 1995, S. 298,
141 CONG. REC. 3001 (Jan. 31, 1995) (attempting to establish a “comprehensive
policy [for] health care coverage and services to individuals with a severe mental
illness and noting this bill had been introduced previously); see also Mental Health
and Substance Abuse Parity Amendments of 1998, H.R. 3568, 105th Cong. (Mar. 26,
1998) (amending the 1996 MHPA); The Mental Health Equitable Treatment Act of
1999, S. 796, 106th Cong. (Apr. 14, 1999) (requiring parity for inpatient hospital
days and outpatient doctor visits, and full parity for “severe mental illness”).
81. Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-204, § 702(a), 110 Stat.
2944 (Sept. 26, 1996).
82. See Robert Pear, Conferees Agree on More Coverage for Health Care, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 20, 1996, at A1 (containing Senator Domenici’s description of the Act as “a
historic step, a breakthrough, for the severely mentally ill . . . [Congress has taken]
one step to get rid of the terrible stigma and discrimination that’s based on mystique,
mystery and Dark Age concepts”); see also Mental Health Parity Act to Take Effect at
Midnight: Landmark Law to Benefit Millions of Americans, Media Alert, National Alliance
for the Mentally Ill (Dec. 31, 1997) (quoting Laurie Flynn, Executive Director of
NAMI, as stating that “[t]he days of being cast as second-class citizens from a health
care system historically indifferent to their needs are over.”), at
http://www.nami.org/pressroom/971231182629.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2001).
83. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(b)(1) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (requiring actual
equality in benefits only for lifetime and annual aggregate spending caps).
84. See 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
(a) In general
(1) Aggregate lifetime limit. In the case of a group health plan . . . that
provides both medical and surgical benefits and mental health benefits—
(A) No lifetime limit. If the plan or coverage does not include an aggregate
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health insurers to actually offer a mental health benefit; (2) prohibit
group health plans from using other methods to control utilization
or imposing higher copays and deductibles for mental health
86
services; (3) apply to small businesses employing from two to fifty
87
88
employees; or (4) extend to substance abuse treatments.
Furthermore, the bill contains a provision allowing insurers to optout of parity, despite meeting other requirements, if providing parity
89
coverage raises overall plan costs more than one percent. Lastly, the
bill contains a “sunset” provision, phasing-out the parity requirements
90
for benefits furnished on or after September 30, 2001.

lifetime limit [on medical or surgical benefits, it] may not impose any
aggregate lifetime limit on mental health benefits.
(B) Lifetime limit. If the plan or coverage includes an aggregate lifetime
limit . . . the plan or coverage shall either—
(i) apply the applicable lifetime limit both to the medical and surgical
benefits . . . and to mental health benefits and not distinguish in the
application of such limit . . . or
(ii) not include any aggregate lifetime limit on mental health benefits that is
less than the applicable lifetime limit.
....
(2) Annual Limits. In the case of a group health plan . . . that provides both
medical and surgical benefits and mental health benefits—
(A) No annual limit. If the plan or coverage does not include an annual
limit . . . [it] may not impose any annual limit on mental health benefits.
(B) Annual limit. If the plan or coverage includes an annual limit . . . the
plan or coverage shall either—
(i) apply [such limit] to both the medical and surgical benefits . . . and to
mental health benefits and not distinguish in the application of such
limit . . . or
(ii) not include any annual limit on mental health benefits that is less than
the applicable annual limit.
Id.
85. See id. § 1185a(b)(1) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed . . . as
requiring a group health plan . . . to provide any mental health benefits.”).
86. See id. § 1185a(b)(2). [This section shall not affect] the terms and conditions
[of a group health plan offering a mental health benefits] (including cost sharing,
limits on the number of visits or days of coverage, and requirements relating to
medical necessity) relating to the amount, duration, or scope of mental health
benefits . . . except as provided [in regard to parity in lifetime limits or annual
limits.] Id.
87. See id. § 1185a(c)(1). (“This section shall not apply to any group health plan
. . . for any plan year of a small employer.”) Small employer is defined as “an
employer who employed an average of at least 2 but not more than 50 employees on
business days during the preceding calendar year and who employs at least 2
employees on the first day of the plan year.” Id.
Id. § 1185a(c)(1)(B).
88. See id. § 1185a(e)(4) (“The term ‘mental health benefits’ . . . does not does
not include benefits with respect to treatment of substance abuse or chemical
dependency.”).
89. See id. § 1185a(c)(2) (“This section shall not apply . . . if the application of
this section results . . . in an increase in the cost under the plan (or for such
coverage) of at least one percent.”).
90. See id. § 1185a(f) (“This section shall not apply to benefits for services
furnished on or after September 30, 2001.”).
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Consequently, the 1996 MHPA has been criticized by some observers
91
as incomplete and inadequate.
D. Opposition to Parity
The limitations included in the final 1996 MHPA, however, belie
the vigorous effort exerted by the legislation’s sponsors to increase
92
protection for the mentally ill, and instead should be primarily
attributed to intense opposition lodged by several interest groups to
93
Congress, and many
any mental health parity requirement.
observers and interested parties, were taken by surprise by the
passage of an initial, far-reaching parity bill in April of 1996, offered
by Senators Domenici and Wellstone as an amendment to
94
“Kassebaum-Kennedy” health insurance reform legislation.
By a
95
vote of sixty-eight to thirty, a full-blown, comprehensive parity
96
measure was added to the Senate version of S. 1028, the Health

91. See John Hendren, A Parody of Parity: ‘96 Law Not Much Help to Mentally Ill,
CHI. SUN TIMES, Aug. 12, 1998, at 58 (surveying the limitations of the MHPA and
quoting Robert Gabriele, senior vice president of the National Mental Health
Association, who stated that “the act has a hole big enough to drive a truck
through . . . [and] [i]t isn’t real parity”); Christopher Aaron Jones, Note, Legislative
“Subterfuge”?: Failing to Insure Persons with Mental Illness Under the Mental Health Parity
Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 50 VAND. L. REV. 753, 757 (1997) (noting
that the MHPA “leaves . . . important limitations [in mental health care coverage]
untouched . . . .”); cf. 29 U.S.C. § 1185a (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (providing parity just
for aggregate annual and lifetime benefit caps), with Domenici/Wellstone
Amendment No. 3681, S. 1028, 104th Cong. (1996), 142 CONG. REC. S. 3670 (daily
ed. Apr. 18, 1996) (providing for full parity for mental health benefits in all
respects). The MHPA that became law was a far less comprehensive measure than
the one that originally passed the Senate as an amendment to S. 1028, the
“Kassebaum-Kennedy” health care bill. Despite a strong Senate vote for the original,
full-scale provision, no mental health provision whatsoever survived Conference
Committee negotiations between the House and Senate. See Jones, supra note 91, at
767-69.
92. See Jones, supra note 91, at 766-69 (discussing Domenici’s and Wellstone’s
efforts to pass parity legislation).
93. See 142 CONG. REC. S9386 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1996) (referring to the fierce
opposition to full parity from certain sectors and quoting Senator Simpson (R-WY) as
stating “I am especially troubled that some of the interest groups—boy, have they
been sharpening their fangs in this session . . . I have felt a little of it—have been so
aggressive in lobbying against [parity].”); see also Small Business Backs Health Care
Compromise, U.S. Newswire, June 19, 1996, LEXIS Library, U.S. Newswire File
(containing the statement of Jack Faris, President of the National Federation of
Independent Business). “Any form of the mental health provision is a poison pill to
the health care compromise.” See id.
94. See 142 CONG. REC. S3592 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1996) (containing the floor vote
for the original parity amendment); see also 54 CONG. Q. (BNA) 1077, 1077 (1996)
(discussing the surprising defeat of Senator Kassebaum’s motion to table the original
Domenici/Wellstone amendment).
95. See id.
96. See H.R. 3108, § 305(b), 104th Cong. (Apr. 23, 1996) (requiring equality
between mental health benefits and medical/surgical benefits in annual and lifetime
dollar limits, inpatient hospital days and outpatient doctor visits, and coinsurance
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Insurance Portability and Protection Act (“HIPPA”). However, no
parallel provision existed in the House version of HIPPA, making the
Domenici parity amendment a prime target during conference
98
negotiations between the House and Senate.
The two main arguments raised in opposition to the mental health
parity are: (1) that parity is a benefit mandate; and (2) that parity will
99
raise the cost of coverage. According to these arguments, any cost
increase within an employer-provided voluntary health insurance
100
market would result in corresponding reductions in coverage.
In
the voluntary market, parity legislation is particularly vulnerable to
the assertion that, given the choice between increasing cost of parity
mental health coverage or simply dropping mental health coverage
altogether, many group health plans would choose the latter, thereby
increasing the number of individuals with no mental health benefits
101
whatsoever.
At the time of the amendment, numerous competing

rates).
97. See id.
98. See Senate Passes Kassebaum-Kennedy, Setting Stage for Conference with the House, 5
HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 629, 629 (Apr. 25, 1996) (statement of Senate Majority
Leader Robert Dole) [hereinafter Dole Statement] (remarking “[that the
Domenici/Wellston Amendment is] a very, very expensive provision, and it’s going
to cause all kinds of problems.”).
99. Essentially, these two issues are the same argument, i.e. that benefit mandates
will raise costs. See Bureau of National Affairs, Employers Groups Study Bolsters Claims of
Negative Side of Mental Health Parity, 4 HEALTH CARE POL. REP. (BNA) 995, 995 (June
10, 1996) (reporting that a study commissioned by employer groups estimated that
parity would result in an 8.7% increase in overall health plan costs, reducing the
number of insured Americans by 1.7 million and costing $20 billion in Federal
revenues). But see Coopers & Lybrand, An Actuarial Analysis of the Domenici-Wellstone
Amendment to S. 1028, “Health Insurance Reform Act” to Provide Parity for Mental Health
Benefits Under Group and Individual Insurance Plans (for the American Psychological
Association) (n.p. Apr. 1996) (estimating a 3.2% increase in premiums attributable
to the provision); Milliman & Robertson, Premium Rate Estimates for a Mental Illness
Parity Provision to S. 1028, The Health Insurance Reform Act of 1996 (n.p. Apr. 1996)
(estimating a 3.9% increase in costs); Congressional Budget Office, CBO’s Estimates of
the Impact on Employers of the National Mental Health Parity Amendment in H.R. 3103,
Washington, D.C., May 1996 (projecting a 4% increase in costs); Mathematica Policy
Research, The Costs and Effects of Parity for Mental Health and Substance Abuse Insurance
Benefits, (for the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration),
Washington, D.C., Mar. 1998 (estimating a 3.6% increase on average).
100. See Federal Mental Health Parity Legislation: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on
Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, 106th Cong. 2 (2000) (testimony of Dean
Rosen, Health Insurance Association of America) [hereinafter Rosen Testimony]
(discussing estimates that each one percent increase in insurance costs results in
200,000 to 300,000 fewer covered lives), available at http://labor.senate.gov/
Hearings/may00hrg/051800wt/05180jmj/05180emk/domenici/rosen/rosen.htm.
101. See Gail A. Jensen, Ph.D. & Michael A. Morrisey, Mandated Benefit Laws and
Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance, Study Commissioned by the Health Insurance
Association of America (Jan. 1999) (showing that state mandates in Virginia led to
twenty-one percent of claims; in Maryland eleven to twenty-two percent of claims; in
Massachusetts, thirteen percent of claims; and Idaho and Iowa, five percent of
available
at
claims,
respectively),
http://www.membership.hiaa.org/pdfs/
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actuarial estimates of the cost of parity played heavily into
Conference Committee deliberations, and concerns over the cost of
102
the provision ultimately led to its demise.
After rejection of the initial, far-reaching parity amendment in
103
Conference, the bill’s sponsors scaled back the scope and cost of
104
the provision and made several attempts to attach a fallback version
105
Despite dramatically
to the final HIPPA Conference Agreement.
106
reducing the parity amendment’s scope, requirements, and cost,
107
the parity amendment was rejected by the Conferees.
Angered at
this result, parity sponsors vowed to bring parity back to the Senate
108
and successfully offered the fallback version as an
floor,
amendment to the Veterans Affairs/Housing and Urban
Development Appropriations (VA-HUD) bill in the waning days of
109
the 104th Congress.
Ultimately, the amendment was later signed
110
into law as the 1996 MHPA.
The 1996 MHPA was a landmark for mental health advocates and

jensenrpt.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2000).
102. See Dole Statement, supra note 98 (arguing that the parity amendment should
be removed); see also supra note 99 (surveying the numerous cost estimates
circulating at the time of the MHPA’s consideration).
103. See Steve Langdon, Kennedy, Kassebaum Steer Insurance Bill to Safety, 54 CONG.
Q. (BNA) 2197, 2197 (1996) (discussing the Conferees’ efforts to remove mental
health parity due to strenuous objection by some Members and the business
community).
104. See id. Compare Domenici-Wellstone Amendment No. 3681, S. 1028, 104th
Cong. (1996), 142 CONG. REC. S3670 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1996), with Mental Health
Parity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-204, § 702(a), 110 Stat. 2944 (Sept. 26, 1996)
(providing for far less protection for the mentally ill than the earlier, more complete
version passed as an amendment to the “Kassebaum-Kennedy” health care bill).
105. See Shannon, supra note 77, at 97 (acknowledging the 1996 MHPA sponsors’
willingness to proffer less comprehensive and expensive parity measures to the
Conference Committee).
106. See discussion supra Part I.C-D (discussing the opposition in Congress
concerning mental health parity reform).
107. See Shannon, supra note 77, at 98 (stating that when the Conference
Committee on HIPPA finished, mental health parity had been eliminated).
108. See 142 CONG. REC. S9292 (July 31, 1996) (containing Senator Domenici’s
sentiments on the failure to include any mental health parity provision in the
Conference agreement). “I say publicly now . . . and I do not say this very often—but
‘[s]hame, shame on you.” See id. See also Eric Schmitt, Wages and Health Lead the
Agenda as Congress Acts, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1996, at A1 (containing Domenici’s vow
that “this issue is not going away”).
109. See Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development
and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-204, 110 Stat. 2974
(Sept. 26, 1996); see also House Asks Conference to Back Senate Health Measures, NAT’L J.
CONG. DAILY, Sept. 11, 1996 (describing the vote of 392-17 in a non-binding motion
to instruct the conferees to acquiesce to the Senate health amendments), available at
1996 WL 10091427.
110. See Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development
and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-204, 110 Stat. 2974
(Sept. 26, 1996); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
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111

consumers, yet the limitations discussed above demonstrate the
112
Moreover, the looming “sunset”
need for increased protections.
113
date provides additional impetus for new legislation. Fortunately,
legislation currently exists that moves these protections forward, and
114
does so in an effective, appropriate manner.
II. Managing Parity: Senate Bill 543—The Mental Health Equitable
Treatment Act of 2001
A. The Nexus of Cost and Coverage in a Voluntary System
Today, a majority of Americans with private health care coverage
115
As the cost of health
receive such benefits from their employer.
116
care coverage has increased it has become clear that the overall
number of “covered lives” is related to fluctuations in the cost of such
117
Specifically, projections suggest that every one percent
coverage.
increase in premiums increases the number of uninsured Americans
118
by 200,000 to 300,000.
Further, there is evidence that coverage
119
mandates have discernable impacts on the cost of health insurance.
Against this backdrop, any legislation mandating certain benefits
must be aware of the overall cost and coverage impacts concomitant
120
This cost awareness is no less true for mental
with the mandate.
health services. A 1990 study found that, among state benefit

111. See Pear, supra note 82, at A1 (containing statement of Senator Domenici that
the 1996 MHPA represents “a historic step, a breakthrough, for the severely mentally
ill”).
112. See discussion supra Part I.C (addressing the limitations of the 1996 MHPA).
113. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (providing the “sunset” date of the
1996 MHPA at Sept. 30, 2001).
114. See discussion infra Part II (discussing S. 543’s legislative approach).
115. See McGuire, supra note 4, at 4 (asserting that sixty percent of Americans are
covered by private health insurance).
116. See Moderate Rise in Employer Health Costs Not Likely to Last, Foster Higgins Says, 5
HEALTH CARE POL. REP. (BNA) 158, 158 (Jan. 1997) (covering past cost increases and
predicting sharper increases than those experienced in 1996).
117. See Rosen Testimony, supra note 98 (discussing the impact on covered lives of
increases in health premiums).
118. See id. (noting that the Congressional Budget Office estimated that a one
percent increase in premiums would increase the number of uninsured Americans
by 200,000 in 1996, but since that time, private economists have estimated a coverage
lost rate of 300,000 Americans for every one percent increase in premium cost).
119. See Gail A. Jensen, Ph.D. & Michael A. Morrisey, Mandated Benefit Laws and
Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance, Study Commissioned by the Health Insurance
Association of America, (Jan. 1999), available at http://www.hiaa.org/news/newsstate/jensen.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2001) (discussing which benefits were found
to increase costs by the greatest percentages).
120. See id. (showing that increased medical benefit costs are offset either through
increased costs to employee-beneficiaries, reductions in employee compensation or
reductions in the number of employees electing to purchase coverage).
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mandates, inpatient psychiatric hospital stays increased the cost of
coverage by thirteen percent, and psychologist visit benefits increased
121
costs by twelve percent. Despite dour predictions of runaway cost
122
increases associated with a parity provision during the 1996 debate,
insurance claims and cost data accumulated since the provision’s
implementation have shown that parity coverage is not prohibitively
123
expensive.
A General Accounting Office study of the
implementation and effects of the 1996 MHPA found that thirtyseven percent of surveyed employers reported no increase in claims
costs attributable to their implementation of the MHPA, and only
124
three percent of respondents suggested any increase in costs.
Additionally, less than one percent of employers dropped mental
125
health coverage altogether as a result of the MHPA.
Such cost data, however, does not provide a full picture of the
effect of the 1996 MHPA on the provision of mental health benefits
126
coverage.
One significant result of the 1996 MHPA mandate was
127
the institution of more restrictive plan features by insurers. Almost
128
two-thirds of newly-compliant employers adopted at least one
additional restriction on mental health benefits to offset the 1996
129
MHPA’s mandate, resulting in eighty-seven percent of compliant
130
plans containing additional mental health benefit restrictions.

121. See id. (showing that state mandates in Virginia led to twenty-one percent of
claims; in Maryland eleven to twenty-two percent of claims; in Massachusetts, thirteen
percent of claims; and Idaho and Iowa, five percent of claims, respectively).
122. See Employer Group’s Study Bolsters Claims of Negative Side of Mental Health Parity,
4 HEALTH CARE POL. REP. (BNA) 995 (1996) (surveying cost projections produced at
the time of the initial, comprehensive 1996 parity amendment).
123. See GAO Letter Report, supra note 14, at 16-17 (finding that “[s]everal studies
aimed at estimating the costs of the federal parity law concluded that requiring parity
limits would result in cost increases of less than 1 percent.”).
124. See id. at 16 (noting, however, that compliance with the MHPA was associated
with increased restrictions in other plan features, such as higher copays and
deductibles and limited outpatient visits and inpatient hospital days).
125. See id. at 17.
126. See id. at 13 (concluding that employers who adopted the federal parity
requirements were more likely to restrict access to mental health coverage by
“tightening other design features” than those employers who did not change the
dollar limits).
127. See id. (noting that the most common restrictive changes were limitations on
outpatient office visits and hospital days).
128. See id. at 5 (using the term “newly-compliant” to reference those employers
whose plans did not meet the 1996 MHPA’s coverage requirements prior to its
enactment).
129. See id. at 13 (finding that “[a]bout 65 percent . . . of employers that adopted
annual of lifetime parity in dollar limits after 1996 changed at least one other mental
health design feature to a more restrictive one.”).
130. See id. at 12 tbl. 3 (listing the restrictive elements of mental health benefit
plan design). Almost two-thirds of plans with 1996 MHPA mandated coverage
provide fewer inpatient hospital days and outpatient visits. See id.
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Consequently, any new mental health benefit mandate must expand
benefits for the insured while allowing insurers to manage the
benefits and control costs, without reducing the number of covered
131
lives.
B. The Federal Employee Health Benefits (“FEHB”) Program and the
Washington Business Group on Health (“WBGH”)
On June 7, 1999, during remarks at the White House Conference
on Mental Health, President Clinton announced Executive Order
132
13,124, directing the Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”) to
implement parity benefits for federal employees enrolled in the
133
Federal Employee Health Benefit (“FEHB”) program. In response,
OPM contracted with the Washington Business Group on Health
134
(“WBGH”), a member organization with nearly 150 large employer
members, to assist in assessing members’ experiences and best
practices in providing mental health care, and to analyze the
recommendations of large employers currently providing generous
135
or parity mental health coverage.
Based largely on these
136
employers’ experiences and input, OPM instructed participating

131. See id. at 21 (recommending that Congress consider state laws requiring
parity both in service limits and cost-sharing requirements to determine the potential
cost of extending parity to alleviate the “restrictions . . . that may have offset the
parity achieved in dollar limits.”).
132. See Exec. Order No. 13,124, 3 C.F.R. 192 (1999), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 3301
(1994 & Supp. V 1999). The order states:
The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and the President’s Task
Force on Employment of Adults with Disabilities believe that the Federal
Government could better benefit from the contributions of persons with
psychiatric disabilities if they were given the same opportunities available to
people with mental retardation or severe physical disabilities.
Id. § 1(c).
133. See Remarks at the White House Conference on Mental Health, PUB. PAPERS
894 (June 7, 1999). The President stated: “I am using my authority as President to
ensure that . . . the Federal Employee Health Benefit Plan . . . provides full parity for
mental health . . . they [health plans participating in FEHBP] must provide equal
coverage for mental and physical illnesses.” Id. at 896.
134. See Kristen Reasoner Apgar, Report to the Office of Personnel Management, Large
Employer Experiences and Best Practices in Design, Administration, and Evaluation of Mental
Health and Substance Abuse—A Look at Parity in Employer-Sponsored Health Benefit
Programs (Mar., 2000), available at www.opm.gov/insure/mental/ (last visited Nov. 5,
2001) [hereinafter Report to OPM] (containing information provided by American
Airlines, AT&T, Delta Air Lines, Eastman Kodak, General Motors, IBM, the
Massachusetts Group Insurance Commission and Pepsico).
135. See id. at 1 (“The aim was to provide OPM with suggestions, examples and
analysis that may assist it as it moves forward with its parity initiative.”).
136. See Janice R. Lachance, Memorandum for Personnel Directors of Executive
Departments and Agencies: Mental Health and Substance Abuse Parity Implementation in the
Federal Employees Health Benefits (FEHB) Program (July 13, 2000) (stating that “[t]he
[WBGH] report helped us immeasurably to clarify issues and refine our approach.”),
available at http://www.opm.gov/insure/health/parity/071300_mental_health.htm
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FEHB plans to “provide network parity coverage for all diagnostic
categories of mental health and substance abuse conditions listed in
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition
137
(DSM IV)” beginning with the 2001 contract year. OPM explicitly
stated that “[t]he overriding goal of parity is to expand the range of
138
benefits offered while managing costs effectively”
and they
“encouraged health plans to manage mental health . . . care in order
139
The key to the approach chosen by OPM
to [meet these ends].”
was that parity “can be introduced, using appropriate care
management . . . delivered in a fully coordinated managed behavioral
health environment that incorporates techniques such as case
management, authorized treatment plans, gatekeepers and referral
mechanisms, contracting networks, pre-certification of inpatient
services, concurrent review, discharge planning, [and] retrospective
140
review and disease management.”
C. Quality Sacrificed in the Name of Parity?
The emphasis OPM placed on cost management, and the specter
of an increasing role for managed care in providing mental health
services, raises concerns regarding access to quality, appropriate
141
treatment.
Despite those concerns, however, the experiences of

(last visited Sept. 9, 2001).
137. See id. at “attachment” (providing that “[p]arity in the FEHB program means
coverage for mental health, substance abuse, medical, surgical, and hospital services
will be identical with regard to traditional medical care deductibles, coinsurance,
copays and day and visit limitations.”).
138. Id. at attachment.
139. Id.
140. Report to OPM, supra note 134, at 1 (quoting FEHB Program Carrier Letter
No. 1999-027, Mental Health and Substance Abuse Parity (June 7, 1999), available at
http:/www.omp.gov/insure/health/parity/99-027.pdf). Certainly, this approach is
susceptible to broad-side attacks on the methods and procedures utilized under
managed care scenarios generally.
However, employer experiences have
demonstrated that comprehensive, properly coordinated and managed behavioral
health care can not only expand benefits and hold costs in check or reduce them,
but also produce other savings in terms of employee productivity, reduced
absenteeism, and reduced disability claims. See discussion supra at Part II.C
(discussing some of the practical results of the implementation of mental health
parity on health plan and employee experience).
141. See Report to OPM, supra note 134, at 2 (detailing the “essential mechanisms
utilized to manage quality of care [as]: preferred networks; pre-approval of
treatment; a full continuum of treatment settings in the networks; referral
mechanisms to connect employees to correct services; [and] utilization review and
financial accountability.”); see also Alan J. Otten, Mental Health Parity: What Can It
Accomplish in a Market Dominated by Managed Care (June 1998), available at
http://www.milbank.org/mrparity.html (quoting Harvard University’s Richard
Frank as observing that “[m]anaged care drives a wedge between the nominal
benefit, what the plan provides, and the effective benefit, what the patient actually
gets.”) (last visited Sept. 7, 2001) (on file with the American University Law Review). See
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142

participating WBGH members demonstrated that employers with
143
large employee/beneficiary populations can “move to expanded,
parity or near-parity benefits, improve the quality of care, and contain
144
145
or reduce costs.”
For instance, one employer found that before
the implementation of managed parity, employees were being
disproportionately treated in high-cost inpatient settings, but were
not treated prior to hospitalization and did not receive outpatient
146
follow-up services. After implementing a managed care behavioral
147
health “carve-out,” inpatient costs dropped forty-six percent and
148
outpatient costs decreased by twenty-one percent despite more
149
employees accessing and utilizing more services. A recent National
Advisory Mental Health Council (“NAMHC”) study found that
implementation of managed parity by a large employer group (over
150,000 employees) reduced per-member costs by half while the
proportion of employees accessing mental health services actually

generally Harold E. Varmus, M.D., Parity in Financing Mental Health Services: Managed
Care Effects on Cost, Access, and Quality, An Interim Report to Congress by the National
Advisory Mental Health Council 24 (May 1998) (noting “considerable concerns—but
little systematic evidence—about how [managed care] affect[s] both access to care
and quality of care for patients.”).
142. See Report to OPM, supra note 134, at 10 (explaining why certain employers
were chosen). This report states that:
[such employers were selected] because they: Provide generous mental
health and substance abuse benefits that meet or approach parity standards;
Have experience in evaluating benefit plan quality and performance;
Employ successful employee communication programs; Have relevant
experience in addressing behavioral health plan transitions; Provide benefits
to a large number of employees and their families; Have worksite locations
throughout the country; and Represent a variety of industry groups.
Id.
143. See Report to OPM, supra note 134, at 10-11 (stating that the participating
employers employ roughly 1.23 million employees, with approximately 2.4 million
covered lives overall).
144. Id. at 12 (explaining that many of these same employers previously used
higher co-pays and deductibles and other traditional benefit limitations to control
the costs associated with the provision of mental health benefits) (emphasis added).
145. See id. at 11 n.3 (explaining that employers were identified by letter, i.e.
“employer A,” or “employer B” due to employer concerns about the
proprietary/competitive nature of some of the reported data).
146. See id. at 13 (explaining that this was particularly true for adolescents).
147. See Brandi White, Mental Health Care: From Carve-out to Collaboration, available at
http://www.aafp.org.fpm/970900fm/lead.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2001)
(describing a “carve-out” as “arrangements that pull mental health care completely
out of the scope of family practice and other primary care specialties and place it in
the hands of separate mental health care companies.”). This American Academy of
Family Physicians’ report states that carve-outs cover over 120 million Americans. Id.
at 2.
148. See Report to OPM, supra note 134, at 13 (noting that there was no increase
in re-admission rates).
149. See id. at 13 (stating that the driving factor for this particular employer’s
choice of provider network was quality of care).
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150

increased.
Similarly, other studies show parity can lead to reduced costs in
other areas. A 1998 joint study by UNUM Life Insurance Company
and Johns Hopkins University found reduced psychiatric disability
claims costs when employees had access to outpatient mental health
151
services. Likewise, employers providing plans with high deductibles
for mental health services experienced “substantially higher rates of
psychiatric disability claims, increased duration of disability, and
152
decreased likelihood of employees’ returning to work.”
Thus, there is little indication that a properly structured and
managed mental health benefit actually leads to less care, less
appropriate care, or less desirable outcomes.
D. Senate Bill 543—Managing Parity
Senate Bill 543 (“S. 543”), the Mental Health Equitable Treatment
153
154
Act of 2001, parallels the OPM directive, preventing group health
155
plans from “impos[ing] any treatment limitations or financial
156
requirements with respect to the coverage of benefits for mental
illness unless comparable treatment limitations or financial
157
requirements are imposed on medical and surgical benefits.” Like
the OPM directive, S. 543 defines “mental health benefits” as

150. See Ruth L. Kirschstein, M.D., Insurance Parity for Mental Health: Cost, Access,
and Quality, Report to Congress by the National Advisory Mental Health Council, NIH
Publ’n No. 00-4787, at 12 (June 2000) (finding that “compared with the pre-parity
period, per-member costs were halved . . . while the proportion of the population
receiving some mental health services increased” over a three-year period at a major
employer group).
151. See Report to OPM, supra note 134, at 7 (citing D. Salkever, Predictors and
Discriptors of Psychiatric Duration, Cost and Outcomes Study (UNUM Life Insurance Co.)
(1998), and Richard G. Frank et al., The Value of Mental Health Care at the System Level,
HEALTH AFFAIRS 18 (5), at 71-88 (1999)).
152. Varmus, supra note 141, at 31 (quoting D. Salkever, Psychiatric Disability in the
Workplace, INSIGHT (5), at 1 (UNUM Disability Lab, UNUM Life Insurance Co. of
America)(1998)).
153. S. 543, 107th Cong. (2001), supra note 25.
154. See discussion supra Part III.B.
155. See S. 543 § (2)(e)(4) (amending ERISA § 712, 29 U.S.C. § 1185(a))
(defining “treatment limitations” as “limitations on the frequency of treatment,
number of visits or days of coverage, or other limits on the duration or scope of
treatment under the plan or coverage.”).
156. See id. § (2)(e)(1) (amending ERISA § 712, 29 U.S.C. § 1185(a)) (defining
“financial requirements” to include “deductibles, coinsurance, co-payments, other
cost sharing, and limitations on the total amount that may be paid with respect to
benefits under the plan or health insurance coverage with respect to an individual or
other coverage unit [including annual and lifetime limits.]”).
157. Id. § (2)(e)(2) (amending ERISA § 712, 29 U.S.C. § 1185(a)) (defining
“medical or surgical benefits” as “benefits with respect to medical or surgical services,
as defined under the terms of the plan or coverage (as the case may be), but [not
including] mental health benefits.”).
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“benefits with respect to services for all categories of mental health
conditions listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM IV), or the most recent edition if
158
Further, S. 543 constrains
different than the Fourth Edition.”
overall utilization by providing parity only if “such services are
included as part of an authorized treatment plan that is in
accordance with standard protocols[,] and such services meet
159
Unlike the OPM directive,
applicable medical necessity criteria.”
however, S. 543 further limits cost exposure by explicitly excluding
substance abuse and/or chemical dependency from the parity
160
mandate, and does not require health plans to offer mental health
161
benefits.
Senate Bill 543 seeks to capitalize on the experiences of the WBGH
162
members who introduced generous mental health benefits for
beneficiaries, but who did so in an atmosphere designed to provide
the most appropriate treatment in a cost-effective and efficient
163
manner.
Thus far, such benefit designs do not appear to limit
164
access to care or undermine quality in any significant way. In order
to acquire more definitive answers to these concerns, S. 543 requires
the General Accounting Office (“GAO”) to study and evaluate the
impact of S. 543’s implementation on “the cost of health insurance
coverage, access to health insurance coverage (including the
availability of in-network providers), the quality of health care, and
other issues as determined appropriate by the [GAO] Comptroller
165
General.”
As a result, S. 543 represents a balanced, responsible approach to
achieving mental health parity.
It provides substantial new
protections for Americans with a mental illness, allows insurers and

158. Id. § (2)(e)(3) (amending ERISA § 712, 29 U.S.C. § 1185(a)).
159. Id. (amending ERISA § 712, 29 U.S.C. § 1185(a)).
160. See id. (amending ERISA § 712, 29 U.S.C. § 1185(a)) (stating that S. 543
“[does] not include benefits with respect to the treatment of substance abuse or
chemical dependency.”).
161. See id. § (2)(b) (amending ERISA § 712, 29 U.S.C. § 1185(a)) (stating that
“[n]othing in this section shall be construed as requiring a group health plan (or
health insurance offered in connection with such a plan) to provide any mental
health benefits.”).
162. Compare the size of the eight WBGH companies surveyed, supra notes 135,
144 (listing the eight companies participating in the survey, and stating that the
number of covered lives overall equaled 2.4 million), with S. 543 § (2)(c)(1)
(amending ERISA § 712, 29 U.S.C. § 1185(a)) (exempting employers of fifty or less).
163. See discussion supra Part II.B (listing the common mechanisms used by
WBGH member participants to provide parity but manage the overall benefit).
164. See supra Part II.C (discussing plan/beneficiary experience under parity
managed behavioral health).
165. See S. 543 § 5(a)-(b) (requiring the results of the study no later than two years
after the date of the act’s enactment).
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health benefit plans to appropriately manage benefits and costs, and
its GAO study requirement will answer vexing questions about the
overall cost and quality of equal benefits in a managed care setting.
III. HISTORY OF LEGAL BATTLES FOR PARITY
Yet, legislative action is only one part of a two-part strategy to
166
The second part of
increase legal protections for the mentally ill.
this strategy looks to the courts, seeking to draw unequal health care
coverage under the protective aegis of the ADA, making “parity
167
coverage” a legal requirement for certain populations.
“[T]he ADA seeks to ensure access to equal employment
168
opportunities [for the disabled] based on merit.”
In the wake of
the passage of the ADA, practically every federal appellate circuit in
the nation has considered challenges to unequal coverage of mental
169
illness in employee benefit plans brought under its various titles.
170
Although the circuits are divided on some key questions presented,

166. See discussion supra Part II (advocating for Federal legislation mandating
mental health parity in a manner similar to that recently implemented in Federal
Employee Health Benefit plans).
167. See discussion infra Part IV (specifying the requirements for an individual
challenge to unequal mental health benefits coverage under ADA Title I
protections).
168. Equal Opportunity Employment Commission Interpretive Guidance on Title
I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. (2000) [hereinafter
EEOC Guidance] (providing background on the ADA and guidance for
implementing Title I provisions). “The ADA is a federal antidiscrimination statute
designed to remove barriers which prevent qualified individuals with disabilities from
enjoying the same employment opportunities that are available to persons without
disabilities.” Id. at pt. 1630, app.
169. See EEOC v. Staten Island Sav. Bank, 207 F.3d 144, 145 (2d Cir. 2000)
(holding the EEOC’s practice of providing less long-term disability coverage for
mental disabilities than for physical disabilities did not violate Title 1 of the ADA);
Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2000)
(finding that plaintiff was not qualified to sue under Title I of the ADA because
plaintiff could not perform essential functions of job due to total disability); Kimber
v. Thiokol Corp., 196 F.3d 1092, 1101 (10th Cir. 1999) (asserting that employer’s
two-year cap on mental disability benefits does not violate ADA); Lewis v. Kmart
Corp., 180 F.3d 166, 171-72 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating that the federal disability statutes
are not intended to guarantee equal treatment of all disabilities); Ford v. ScheringPlough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 611 (3d Cir. 1998) (restating position that insurance
companies’ unequal treatment of various disabilities does not violate the ADA and
requires no justification); Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1019 (6th Cir.
1997) (emphasizing that the ADA is designed to prevent discrimination between
disabled and non-disabled); EEOC v. CNA Ins. Co., 96 F.3d 1039, 1044 (7th Cir.
1996) (explaining that the employer’s disability plan did not violate the ADA because
the plan offered equal access, terms and prices to all employees); Modderno v. King,
82 F.3d 1059, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (referring to Supreme Court’s finding that the
ADA allows the handicapped to participate in federal health care but does not
guarantee equal results to non-handicapped individuals).
170. Compare Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1110 (holding that the plaintiff did not have
standing to bring a challenge under Title I of the ADA because she was claiming
complete disability, and was therefore unable to perform the “essential functions” of
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the overarching conclusion has been that unequal coverage does not
171
constitute illegal discrimination under the ADA.
In reaching this conclusion, federal courts have raised three
seemingly insurmountable obstacles. First, several circuits have
found that the individuals suing lacked a cognizable claim under the
ADA because they were not “qualified individuals” for the purposes of
172
the ADA’s remedial powers. Second, even where the court did find
173
standing under the ADA, the claims still failed because the ADA
does not require equality “between types of disabilities,” but requires
174
equality between the disabled and the non-disabled.
Therefore,
comprehensive coverage of certain disabilities within a long-term
disability plan is permissible only if all employees are subject to the
same terms and conditions of participation, e.g. equal access to the
175
Finally, several
benefit plan or identical charges for participation.

the job whether with “reasonable accommodation” or not), with Ford, 145 F.3d at 607
(declining to follow other circuits, and interpreting Title I of the ADA to “allow
disabled former employees to sue their former employers regarding their disability
benefits so as to effectuate the full panoply of rights guaranteed by the ADA”).
171. See Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1116 (finding no violation of the ADA where all
employees are given equal access to health and disability plans); Ford, 145 F.3d at 608
(holding that different treatment of mental and physical illness in a long-term
disability plan did not violate the ADA).
172. See Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1108 (“An ADA plaintiff bears the burden of proving
that she is a ‘qualified individual with a disability’ . . . [a] totally disabled person who
cannot ‘perform the essential functions of the employment position’ with or without
reasonable accommodations cannot be a ‘qualified individual’ entitled to sue under
Title I of the Act.” (quoting Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 806
(1999)). See id.
173. See Ford, 145 F.3d at 608 (favoring a “broad temporal interpretation of
‘qualified individual with a disability,’” the Ford court disagreed with “sister courts of
appeals” in finding that Title I of the ADA does “permit totally disabled individuals to
sue their former employers regarding their disability benefits.”).
174. See id. at 609 (noting that although the Ford court disagreed with earlier
decisions denying standing to totally disabled individuals, the court agreed with
those decisions’ holdings based on the merits).
175. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994) (providing under Title I of the ADA
that “[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a
disability because of the disability . . . in regard to . . . terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment”), with Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1116 (stating, “there is no
discrimination under the Act where disabled individuals are given the same
opportunity as everyone else, so insurance distinctions that apply equally to all
employees cannot be discriminatory”). Accord Ford, 145 F.3d at 608 (asserting that
requiring the same benefits for each disability would destabilize the insurance
industry, which is an outcome likely not intended by Congress); EEOC v. CNA Ins.
Co., 96 F.3d 1039, 1044 (7th Cir. 1996) (explaining that employer offered pension
plan that did not differ in terms, cost or availability between disabled and nondisabled, and that without stronger language in the ADA, the court is reluctant to
read statute too broadly); Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 678 (8th
Cir. 1996) (holding that the exclusion of infertility treatments from an employee’s
medical benefits did not constitute discrimination). Citing unequal mental health
benefits as an example, the Krauel court concluded:
Broad distinctions which apply to the treatment of a multitude of dissimilar
conditions and which constrain individuals both with and without
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courts have conspicuously noted the legislative and judicial histories
176
177
178
of the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA, and the 1996 MHPA,
reasoning that, had Congress intended for the ADA to require equal
treatment between benefits for mental and physical illness, Congress
179
would have explicitly said so.
The decisions erecting the standing and “equal access to unequal
plans” obstacles find roots in earlier Supreme Court decisions, which
apply analogous provisions of the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA’s
180
181
precursor, to cases involving unequal disability benefits.
In

disabilities, are not distinctions based on disability . . . although such
distinctions may have a greater impact on certain individuals with disabilities,
they do not intentionally discriminate on the basis of disability and do not
violate the ADA.
Krauel, 95 F.3d at 678.
176. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West 1998 & Supp. 2000);
29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994) (constituting the pre-cursor of the ADA, though applicable
mainly to government programs and activities). Section 504 states: “No otherwise
qualified individual with a disability in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of
his or her disability, be excluded from . . . participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity . . . conducted by any
Executive agency.” Id. See also Kimber v. Thiokol Corp., 196 F.3d 1092, 1102 (10th
Cir. 1999) (citing to Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998); Modderno v. King, 82
F.3d 1059, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1996)) (finding that “[b]ecause the language of the ADA
mirrors that in the Rehabilitation Act, we look to cases construing the Rehabilitation
Act for guidance”). In Modderno, the D.C. Circuit rejected a challenge of unequal
disability benefits for mental health brought under the Rehabilitation Act, stating
“distinctions between mental and physical care are no more vulnerable under § 540
than are completely generalized limits.” See Modderno, 82 F.3d at 1062.
177. See EEOC v. Staten Island Sav. Bank, 207 F.3d 144, 146 (2d Cir. 2000)
(indicating hesitance to stretch the ADA beyond it’s typical interpretation). The
court stated that:
The ADA, unclear on its face, does not specifically condemn the historic and
nearly universal practice inherent in the insurance industry of providing
different benefits for different disabilities . . . [o]f course, Congress could
require those modifications to be made, but we are reluctant to infer such a
mandate for radical change absent a clearer legislative command.
Id. at 149.
178. See Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1017 (6th Cir. 1999)
(referring to the rejection of the original MHPA from health care reform legislation
in 1996). The court remarked that:
Few, if any mental health advocates have thought that the result they would
like to see [parity required under the ADA] has been there all along in the
ADA. This is well illustrated by the debate over a proposed amendment to
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996. The
amendment, [the MHPA] which was defeated before final passage of the bill,
would have required parity of coverage for mental and physical conditions.
This debate reinforces our conclusion based on the language of the ADA
that the issue of parity among physical and mental health benefits is one that
is still in the legislative arena.
Id.
179. See id.
180. See Lewis v. Kmart Corp., 180 F.3d 166, 171 (4th Cir. 1999) (asserting that
Title I of the ADA is the “sister provision” of § 504(a) of the Rehabilitation Act, and
that the anti-discrimination language parallels each other).
181. See Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 549 (1988) (citing to 1977 Department
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182

Traynor v. Turnage, the Supreme Court denied an attempt to
overturn a Veterans’ Administration regulation denying extended GI
Bill education benefits to veterans whose alcohol-related disability was
the result of “willful misconduct,” but allowed the extension for
individuals whose alcoholism was caused by an underlying mental
183
illness. The Court stated, “[t]here is nothing in the Rehabilitation
Act that requires that any benefit extended to one category of
handicapped persons also be extended to all other categories of
184
185
handicapped persons.”
Similarly, in Alexander v. Choate, the
Supreme Court found that a Tennessee Medicaid provision limiting
the number of covered inpatient hospital days was not discriminatory
186
under the Rehabilitation Act.
Although the provision
disproportionately impacted the disabled, the provision was
technically non-discriminatory because all Medicaid beneficiaries had
187
equal access to the benefit.
Courts considering challenges to
unequal disability benefits brought under the ADA have relied
significantly on Traynor and Alexander for guidance in their
188
decisions, and have roundly decided that the legislative and judicial
pedigrees of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA preclude their
application in a way that broadly declares unequal benefits illegally
189
discriminatory. Based solely on these decisions, the route to equal

of Health, Education and Welfare regulations stating that the “exclusion of a specific
class of handicapped persons from a program limited by federal statute or executive
order to a different class of handicapped persons is not prohibited”); Alexander v.
Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
182. See id.
183. See id. at 550 (noting that the GI Bill does not deny benefits to all alcoholics
but only those whose drinking is not rooted in a mental illness).
184. Id.
185. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
186. See id. at 287 (explaining that state does not have to provide more coverage
for the disabled, and that the ADA does not require state to vary coverage between
illnesses).
187. See id. at 302 (finding that “[t]he reduction in inpatient coverage will leave
both handicapped and nonhandicapped Medicaid users . . . subject to the same
duration limitation.”). The reduction in covered inpatient days, the Court found,
was “neutral on its face.” Id.
188. See Lewis, 180 F.3d at 171 (noting the Supreme Court’s decision in Traynor,
the Lewis court stated that the Supreme Court “has never held that it is unlawful
under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act to give preferential treatment to one
disability over another”); see also Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 608
(3d Cir. 1998) (applying the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Alexander and finding
that “handicapped citizens did not suffer from discrimination because both
handicapped and non-handicapped individuals were ‘subject to the same durational
limitation.’”).
189. See Lewis, 180 F.3d at 171 (asserting that federal statutes are not designed to
treat all disabilities the same); see also Ford, 145 F.3d at 608 (noting that the ADA does
not require equal coverage for all disabilities, which would destabilize insurance
industry).
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treatment of mental illness through the ADA appears foreclosed.
IV. TITLE I OF THE ADA AND A CASE-BY-CASE STRATEGY

While there is virtual unanimity among the circuits that the blanket
unequal treatment of mental illness in employee benefit plans does
191
not constitute a violation of the ADA, the state of ADA law
192
regarding individualized job discrimination claims is still evolving.
Instead of attempting to achieve an overarching judicial declaration
193
that unequal coverage is presumptively discriminatory, mental
health advocates should consider an individualized legal approach.
Chief among the areas of evolving ADA case law which could prove
fertile soil for mental health advocates is the doctrine of “reasonable
194
accommodation” made to an employee with a disability.
Essentially, the reasonable accommodation doctrine requires
employers to take reasonable steps to accommodate their disabled
195
employees.
Yet, as of this date, no case has been brought seeking
equal benefits for mental illness on the basis that providing such
coverage would be a “reasonable accommodation” by an employer to
allow an employee to continue working. The approach utilizing the
reasonable accommodation doctrine does not broadly challenge the
underlying benefits structure, but instead addresses the

190. See discussion supra Part III (including adverse decisions from a majority of
Federal circuits for individuals challenging unequal benefits for mental illness).
191. See Staten Island Sav., 207 F.3d at 144; accord Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1104; Kimber,
196 F.3d at 1092; Lewis, 180 F.3d at 166; Ford, 145 F.3d at 601; Parker, 121 F.3d at
1006; CNA Ins., 96 F.3d at 1039; Modderno, 82 F.3d at 1059.
192. Compare James v. Frank, 772 F. Supp. 984, 997 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (holding that
the provision of a chair with wheels and arms for an above-the-knee amputee was not
an unreasonable accommodation and did not impose undue hardship on his
employer, the U.S. Postal Service), with Regulations to Implement the Equal
Employment Opportunity Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(o)(2)(i) (1996) (stating that the obligation to make reasonable
accommodation does not apply to providing wheelchairs or eyeglasses).
193. See discussion supra Part III (discussing various cases in which courts have
repeatedly ruled that unequal treatment benefits between disabilities does not
qualify as discrimination under the ADA).
194. See discussion infra Part IV.A-D (discussing the criteria that must be met in
order to receive the protection of Title I of the ADA by claiming that an employer
has failed to provide reasonable accommodations).
195. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (1994).
The term, “reasonable accommodation” may include—
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and
useable by individuals with disabilities; and
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to
a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices,
appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials,
or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other
similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities.
Id.

NELSONPP.DOC

120

12/4/2001 11:49 AM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:91

individualized effects of such unequal coverage on a case-by-case
basis, with the ultimate goal of obtaining necessary medical
196
treatment. By framing the issue as a measure to allow an individual
to keep working, this approach helps accomplish one of the mental
health community’s most important and enduring goals—proving
that with equal and fair treatment, people with mental illness can
197
function like any other member of society.
Of course, to obtain relief on an individualized basis, numerous
198
legal hurdles must be cleared and additional criteria satisfied. The
following section provides a generalized framework for the main
questions raised in “reasonable accommodation” cases, then discusses
the prima facia requirements for individualized employment
199
discrimination cases under Title I of the ADA. Finally, the section
applies reasonable accommodation jurisprudence to a hypothetical
real-world scenario, bringing the individualized effects of unequal
mental health benefits within the protective realm of Title I of the
200
ADA.
A. The ADA—Title I
Title I of the ADA regulates employment practices, and states:
“[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual
with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard
to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge
of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms,
201
conditions, and privileges of employment.” In order for a person to

196. See discussion infra Part IV.F (arguing that the key to battling fewer benefits
for mentally ill is to focus on the issue of continued employment, thereby drawing-in
ADA Title I protections).
197. See Domenici Statement, supra note 10, at 3001 (asserting that the MHPA has
the very simple goal of providing treatment for the mentally ill commensurate with
other illnesses).
198. See discussion infra Part IV (discussing the elements of qualified individuals,
reasonable accommodation and undue hardship).
199. See discussion infra Part IV (arguing that individual employment
discrimination cases are more successful in battling mental illness discrimination).
200. See discussion infra Part IV.F (using a hypothetical to demonstrate a potential
Title I lawsuit where the plaintiff argues that the refusal to provide equal benefits
acts as an unreasonable impediment to continued employment).
201. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1) (1994) (defining discrimination as, “limiting,
segregating, or classifying a job applicant or employee in a way that adversely affects
the opportunities or status of such applicant or employee because of the disability of
such applicant or employee.”). The ADA contains four main titles: Title I, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12111-12117 (1994) (regulating private sector employment practices); Title II, 42
U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (1994) (stating application to state and local governments);
Title III, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (1994) (regulating places of public
accommodation and commercial facilities provided by private actors); and Title IV,
42 U.S.C. §§ 12201-12213 (1997) (regulating numerous miscellaneous areas such as
construction, state immunity, prohibition against retaliation and coercion,
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be protected by Title I of the ADA they must be: (1) a “qualified
202
individual” with a disability; (2) who can perform the essential
duties of the position with or without the employer making a
203
“reasonable
accommodation;”
and
(3)
the
reasonable
accommodation cannot impose an “undue hardship” on the
204
employer.
The following subsections analyze these requirements
individually and provide a survey of “reasonable accommodation”
precedent.
B. Qualified Individual
First, a plaintiff must be a “qualified individual with a disability.”

205


regulations by the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board,
attorney’s fees, technical assistance).
202. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994) (defining “qualified individual with a
disability”). This definition states that:
[A]n individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment
position that such individual holds or desires. For the purposes of this title,
considerations shall be given to employer’s judgement as to what functions
of a job are essential, and if an employer has prepared a written description
before advertising or interviewing for the job, this description shall be
considered evidence of the essential functions of the job.
Id.
203. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (1994) (defining “[r]easonable accommodation”).
This definition states that reasonable accommodation is:
making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and useable
by individuals with disabilities; and . . . job restructuring, part-time or
modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or
modification of existing equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or
modifications of examinations, training materials, or policies, the provision
of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for
individuals with disabilities.
Id.
204. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (1994) (defining undue hardship as “an action
requiring significant difficulty or expense, when considered in light of the factors . . .
[considered to determine] . . . whether an accommodation would impose an undue
hardship on a covered entity . . .”). Those considered factors include:
(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this Act; (ii)
the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in the
provision of the reasonable accommodation; the number of persons
employed at such facility; the effect on expenses and resources, or the
impact otherwise of such accommodation upon the operation of the facility;
(iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall size of
the business of a covered entity with respect to the number of its employees;
the number, type and location of its facilities; and (iv) the type of operation
or operations of the covered entity, including the composition, structure,
and functions of the workforce of such entity; the geographic separateness,
administrative, or fiscal relationship of the facility or facilities in question to
the covered entity.
Id.
205. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994) (defining qualified individual); Weyer v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 2000) (surveying
prior court decisions on what constitutes a “qualified individual” for the purposes of
ADA Title I standing).
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As an initial consideration, a person must prove that they actually
206
207
have a “disability,” or an impairment that “substantially limits”
208
their ability to perform “major life activities.”
When a plaintiff
claims an inability to work as limitation in a “major life activity,” they
cannot claim a disability due to the inability to fulfill a targeted,
209
narrow position, but must claim the inability “to work in a broad
210
class of jobs.” Further, a disability must be proved on a case-by-case
211
basis that takes into account any mitigating factors taken by the
212
individual.
Those mitigating factors can be conscious decisions,

206. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000) (defining disabled as “a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities or such
individual . . . a record of such impairment . . . [or] being regarded as have such an
impairment.”).
207. See Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565 (1999) (holding that
“substantially limits” does not mean a mere difference or reduction in function). In
Kirkingburg, a plaintiff who suffered from a vision impairment was not “substantially
limited” in major life function because his sight was limited to one eye. See id. at 564.
208. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (defining disability); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524
U.S. 624, 638 (1998) (requiring that “major life activities” be construed in
compliance with Rehabilitation Act regulations, 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (2000),
which provides a representative list, including “functions such as caring for one’s self,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning
and working .”).
209. See 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(j)(3)(i). Defining substantially limits ability to work as:
[S]ignificantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a
broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person
having comparable training, skills and abilities. The inability to perform a
single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major
life activity of working.
Id.
210. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491 (finding that plaintiffs who were unable to meet
vision requirements for international commercial pilot position did not qualify as
having “substantial impairments” because there were many other similar positions for
which plaintiffs were qualified).
211. See Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. at 567 (citing ADA statutory language in
determining that although a truck driver with monocular vision may “ordinarily”
meet the definition of disability, it is the driver’s burden to prove the extent of his
limitations in the “terms of his own experience”); accord Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 641
(noting that “[i]n the end, the disability does not turn on personal choice,” but
“[w]hen significant limitations result from the impairment, the definition is met even
if the difficulties are insurmountable.”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (defining
disability in terms of the impact of an impairment); Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483 (stating
that “[t]he determination of whether an individual has a disability is not necessarily
based on the name or diagnosis of the impairment the person has, but rather on the
effect of that impairment on the life of the individual.”).
212. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 481 (holding that the use of eyeglasses to correct vision
to “20/20 or better” effectively eliminates a person’s “disability” when severe myopia
is the basis for the ADA claim).
A person whose physical or mental impairment is corrected by medication or
other measures does not have an impairment that presently “substantially
limits” a major life activity. To be sure, a person whose physical or mental
impairment is corrected by mitigating measures still has an impairment, but
if the impairment is corrected it does not “substantially limit” a major life
activity. Id. at 482-83.
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213

such as wearing eyeglasses to correct impaired vision, or can be
subconscious reactions, such as an internal physiological alteration in
214
one eye to compensate for deficiencies in the other.
Second, the plaintiff must be qualified to perform “essential
215
of the position with or without reasonable
functions”
216
accommodation.
As noted earlier, several circuits have concluded
that claims of total disability or the inability to perform a position
regardless of accommodation, presumptively precludes an ADA cause
217
of action under Title I.
Furthermore, being “qualified” is
218
Court
determined relative to the essential functions of the job.
decisions provide numerous examples of functions considered
essential to certain positions, from general requirements, such as
219
220
regularly attending work or reporting on time, to the specific,

213. See id.
214. See Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. at 556 (stating that “[m]itigating measures . . . must
be taken into account in judging whether the individual has a disability . . . whether
the measures taken are with artificial aids, like medications and devices, or with the
body’s own systems.”).
215. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (allowing the employer typically to determine what
duties, if any, are “essential” to a given position).
216. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (defining reasonable accommodation); see also supra
Part IV.C (explaining in detail the reasonable accommodation analysis).
217. See Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir.
2000) (holding that employees have standing under the ADA if they are potentially
capable of satisfying the employment description).
218. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1) (2000) (defining “essential function” as the
fundamental activities of a particular job which an individual holds or is seeking); see
also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2)(i)-(iii) (2000) (suggesting three factors which may be
considered in the “essential function” determination—(1) does the position exist in
order to perform a single function; (2) is the number of employees who can do the
job limited; and (3) is the job highly specialized, such that the employee was hired
for their specific abilities/expertise); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3) (2000) (providing a
list of evidence generally considered to imply essential function).
Evidence of whether a particular function is essential includes, but is not
limited to: (1) the employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential;
(2) written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing
applicants for the job; (3) the amount of time spent on the job performing
the function; (4) the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to
perform the function; (5) the terms of a collective bargaining agreement;
(6) the work experience of past incumbents in the job; and/or (7) the
current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs.
See id.
219. See Horton v. Bd. of Trs. of Cmty. College Dist. No. 508, No. 95-C-2346, 1996
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6879, *13 (N.D. Ill. 1996), aff’d, 1997 U.S. App. Lexis 2470 (7th Cir.
1997) (unpublished opinion) (asserting that “coming to work on a regular basis” is a
necessary qualification for a job, the Horton court found that five years continuous
absence from a position was sufficient indication that plaintiff was not a “qualified
individual” for ADA purposes); accord Teahan v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 80 F.3d
50, 54 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that the link between an employee’s purported
alcohol and drug-related disability and his excessive absenteeism was sufficient to
prove neither standing under Title I nor that his dismissal was motivated “solely for
the reason of his handicap”); Rogers v. Int’l Marine Terminals, 87 F.3d 755, 757 (5th
Cir. 1996) (asserting that an employer was not obligated under the ADA to
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such as the requirement to meet sales quotas
222
unload a truck.

[Vol. 51:91
or the ability to

C. Reasonable Accommodation
Once an individual establishes that they are a “qualified individual”
for ADA purposes, the “reasonable accommodation” analysis takes
223
place. Reasonable accommodations are steps taken by an employer
to permit the disabled individual to perform a job’s essential
functions or to “enjoy the same benefits and privileges of
224
employment as non-disabled individuals.”
In order to invoke the
reasonable accommodation analysis, an employee must: (1) request

accommodate an employee’s alleged ankle injury/disability by providing an
indefinite leave of absence where employee had numerous previous absences for
other reasons); Kinkead v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 49 F.3d 454, 456 (8th Cir.
1995) (deciding that an employee’s fifty percent absenteeism rate pre-dating her
claim of disability was sufficient nondiscriminatory reason to terminate her
employment); Tydnall v. Nat’l Educ. Ctrs., 31 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 1994)
(reasoning that a business college instructor who could not meet the minimum
attendance requirements of the job at issue could not be considered a qualified
individual protected by the ADA); Lewis v. Zilog, 908 F. Supp. 931, 946 (N.D. Ga.
1995), aff’d, 87 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 1996) (maintaining that the failure to return to
work after being granted two sick leave periods due to “stress” meant that the
employee could not perform the job’s essential functions); Vorhies v. Pioneer Mfg.
Co., 906 F. Supp. 578, 581 (D. Colo. 1995) (holding that regular attendance of a job
is an essential function, such that an employee with a back injury was not covered by
the ADA where the accommodation requested, a light duty position, did not exist).
220. See Johnson v. Children’s Hosp., No. Civ.A 94-5698, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7743, at *4-5 (E.D. Pa. 1995), aff’d, 79 F.3d 1138 (3d Cir. 1996) (unpublished
opinion) (finding that excessive tardiness and absenteeism attributable to sickle-cell
anemia rendered the plaintiff unable to be relied upon as a radiologist, and
therefore not a protected party under the ADA); accord Kotlowski v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 922 F. Supp. 790, 798 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that despite finding that an
employee was disabled due to depression for purposes of the ADA, she was otherwise
not qualified for a clerical position due to excessive tardiness and absence).
221. See Sweet v. Elec. Data Sys., No. 95-Civ.-1987 (MBM), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5544, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding that the plaintiff’s failure to meet sales quotas
was the most significant reason for his dismissal, not his difficulty in reading due to
an eye accident).
222. See Munoz v. H&M Wholesale, 926 F. Supp. 596, 608 (S.D. Tex. 1996)
(denying the application of Title I to a delivery truck driver who was required, as part
of his position, to routinely unload barrels of petroleum for customers).
223. See supra Part IV.B (discussing of “qualified individual” as an initial
determination of standing under ADA).
224. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (1994), supra note 203 (defining “[r]easonable
accommodation”).
[M]aking existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and
useable by individuals with disabilities; and . . . job restructuring, part-time or
modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or
modification of existing equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or
modifications of examinations, training materials, or policies, the provision
of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for
individuals with disabilities.
Id.
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225

an accommodation; and (2) demonstrate how the accommodation
will assist the employee to perform the essential functions of the
226
position. Like the determination of disability, reasonableness of an
227
accommodation is determined on a case-by-case basis, involving a
228
The employee bears the initial burden of
specific factual inquiry.
229
demonstrating the “reasonableness” of the accommodation sought,
230
which typically includes a common sense balancing of the proposed
accommodation’s effectiveness and the proportional cost to the
231
employer.


225. See Vorhies, 906 F. Supp. at 581-82 (finding against an employee who failed to
request an accommodation for a back problem); accord Voytek v. Univ. of Cal., No. C92-3465EFL, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12453 (N.D. Cal. 1994), aff’d mem., 77 F.3d 491
(9th Cir. 1996) (unpublished opinion) (holding that an employer is not required to
accommodate for an unknown disability).
226. See Fussell v. Ga. Ports Auth., 906 F. Supp. 1561, 1573 (S.D. Ga. 1995)
(finding against a police officer whose tremor prevented him from passing a firearms
test because the officer could not identify a suitable accommodation).
227. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638-39 (1998) (noting that “the ADA
must be construed to be consistent with regulations issued to implement the
Rehabilitation Act, which does not enunciate a general principal for determining
what is and what is not a major life activity . . . [but] instead provide[s] a
representative list, defining the term to include ‘functions such as caring for one’s
self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing,
learning and working.’”).
228. See Wernick v. Fed. Reserve Bank of New York, 91 F.3d 379, 385 (2d Cir.
1996) (holding that whether an accommodation for a back injury is reasonable is
dependent on an examination of the relevant facts of the situation at issue); see also
29 C.F.R. § 1630.9 (2000) (containing regulations on reasonable accommodation
which parallel the statutory language).
229. See Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir.
2000) (stating that employees bear the burden of demonstrating that they are
qualified individuals “who, with or without reasonable accommodations can perform
the essential functions of [the] job.”).
230. See Lyons v. Legal Aid Soc’y, 68 F.3d 1512, 1517 (2d Cir. 1995) (remanding
for consideration of the question of whether purchasing a parking space close to
work is a reasonable accommodation for an employee suffering serious injuries and
ongoing disability from being struck by an automobile). Factors to be weighed in
this analysis include the employer’s geographic location, the availability of such open
spaces, the employer’s financial status, etc. See id. at 1516; accord Bryant v. Better Bus.
Bureau, 923 F. Supp. 720, 737 (D. Md. 1996) (citing the EEOC’s Interpretive
Guidelines in assessing the “undue hardship” question). These guidelines provide
that:
[Undue hardship] is a multi-faceted, fact-intensive inquiry requiring
consideration of: (1) financial cost; (2) additional administrative burden
implementation; (3) complexity of implementation; and, (4) any negative
impact an accommodation may have on the operation of an employer’s
business, including the accommodation’s effect on its work force.
Id. at 737.
231. See Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 543 (7th Cir. 1995)
(allowing the employer an opportunity to prove that the costs of the accommodation
are excessive in relation to either the benefits derived therefrom or to the employer’s
financial survival and health).
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Court decisions provide examples of accommodations found to be
232
Examples of unreasonable
both reasonable and unreasonable.
requests are: allowing an employee with bi-polar disorder to walk
233
away from supervisors when they caused her stress; requiring an
234
employee to obtain counseling and treatment; or accommodating
an employee in a manner that results in harder work and longer
235
Conversely, examples of measures
hours for other employees.
constituting “reasonable accommodation” include: construction of a
special platform to improve the angle at which security personnel
236
237
viewed monitors; the acquisition of ergonomic furniture; the
238
provision of a chair; and the relocation of employee with HIV239
aggravated allergies to a new, mold free facility.
D. Undue Hardship
Measures constituting a reasonable accommodation are, however,
significantly limited by the requirement that such measures must not

232. See infra notes 233-239.
233. See Reed v. Lepage Bakeries, Inc., 102 F. Supp. 2d 33, 38 (D. Me. 2000)
(finding that an employee with bi-polar disorder had failed to demonstrate that
allowing her to walk away from supervisors in stressful situations was either
reasonable or plausible).
234. See Roberts v. County of Fairfax, 937 F. Supp. 541, 549 (E.D. Va. 1996)
(refusing an employee’s argument that requiring him to attend counseling after
demotion for poor performance was a reasonable accommodation, even though
regular attendance at counseling was recommended by the employee’s physicians).
235. See Henderson v. N.Y. Life, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 527, 540-41 (N.D. Tex. 1997)
(asserting that a request for a part-time schedule or an at-home position to
accommodate hypersensitivity to allergies would result in more work for other
employees, would deprive New York Life (“NYL”) from effective supervision of
employee’s claims processing activity, and would therefore not be reasonable) (citing
Turco v. Hoechst Celanese Chem. Group, 101 F.3d 1090, 1094 (5th Cir. 1996), reh’g
denied, 108 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 1997), and Munoz v. H&M Wholesale, 926 F. Supp.
506, 607-08 (S.D. Tex. 1996)).
236. See Stewart v. Brown County, 86 F.3d 107, 112 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that
the plaintiff’s employer had made numerous accommodations in addition to
constructing a platform, including lowering security monitors and putting blinds on
the windows to reduce glare).
237. See id. at 109-10 (finding that the purchase of an ergonomic chair at the
recommendation of the plaintiff’s chiropractor, in addition to other minor
adjustments of the workplace, was a reasonable accommodation); accord Wernick v.
Fed. Reserve Bank of New York, 91 F.3d 379, 384 (2d Cir. 1996) (relating to a similar
accommodation voluntarily made by an employer for a back problem).
238. See James v. Frank, 772 F. Supp. 984, 991 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (finding that the
delay in obtaining a straight-backed chair accommodating an employee-amputee was
unjustified and unreasonable).
239. See EEOC v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 949 F. Supp. 403,
408 (E.D. Va. 1996) (responding to an employee’s claim that his HIV positive status
magnified his reaction to allergens, his employer moved him to a different office
building that had a separate air conditioning unit for his own office). The court
found that this action was a reasonable accommodation. See id. at 408.
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In determining
impose an undue burden on the employer.
whether a requested accommodation poses an undue hardship,
241
several factors are considered, such as (1) the nature and cost of
242
the accommodation; (2) the size and financial status of the
243
(3) accommodations that are “unduly costly or
employer;
244
extensive;” or (4) which fundamentally alter a business’ operations
245
or a programs nature are considered unreasonably burdensome.
Undue hardship is also determined on a case-by-case basis by
measuring the impact of accommodations proposed by employees as
246
applicable to individual job duties.
Consequently, related court
247
For
decisions reflect the diversity of the American workplace.

240. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (1994); supra note 204 (listing the factors to be
considered when determining “undue hardship”).
(i) [T]he nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this Act; (ii)
the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in the
provision of the reasonable accommodation; the number of persons
employed at such facility; the effect on expenses and resources, or the
impact otherwise of such accommodation upon the operation of the facility;
(iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall size of
the business of a covered entity with respect to the number of its employees;
the number, type and location of its facilities; and (iv) the type of operation
or operations of the covered entity, including the composition, structure,
and functions of the workforce of such entity; the geographic separateness,
administrative, or fiscal relationship of the facility or facilities in question to
the covered entity.
Id.
241. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B) (delineating four categories of factors to be
considered when determining the presence of an undue hardship).
242. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630 app. (2000) (describing an undue hardship as measures
that are “unduly costly, extensive, substantial, or disruptive, or that would
fundamentally alter the nature or operation of the business.”).
243. See id. (stating that, in some cases, the financial situation of the employer in
its entirety should be considered, but in other circumstances, such analysis would be
limited to a specific site or office).
244. See id. (explaining that a sight-impaired individual could not require a
nightclub to provide bright interior lighting in order to work there because the
change would be unduly extensive).
245. See id. (explaining that the nightclub scenario in supra note 244 would also
fundamentally alter the nature of the business); see also HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990, H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 4 (1990)
(re-articulating the four categories of factors considered when determining “undue
hardship” and stating that “[o]nly those accommodations which would require
significant difficulty or expense when considered in light of the size, resources and
structure of the employer would be considered an undue hardship.”); Garcia-Ayala v.
Lederle Parenterals, Inc., 212 F.3d 638, 649 (1st Cir. 2000) (applying these criteria to
the accommodations requested by an employee who had periodic and lengthy
absences from work attributable to several bouts with breast cancer).
246. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630 pt. 1630.2(p), app. (2000) (reflecting concerns that some
accommodations may not take into account the financial realities of a particular
employer, or the potential disruptions to the workplace).
247. Compare Mears v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 905 F. Supp. 1075, 1081 (S.D.
Ga. 1995) (finding that allowing an employee with an inability to handle stress to
remain in a position but prohibiting a supervisor from interacting with her would
undermine the effectiveness of management and pose an undue hardship on the
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instance, although courts have found that forbidding a supervisor
from interacting with an employee with a stress-related disability
248
constitutes an undue hardship, they have found that reassigning
disabled police officers to light duty and/or civilian positions outside
249
the police department does not.
E. The Prima Facie ADA Employment Discrimination Case
Yet, even when an individual is able to meet the above
requirements, an individual will not be automatically qualified to
obtain relief under Title I of the ADA. It is not enough to show: (1)
250
that an employee is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) who
251
can perform the essential functions of the position with or without
252
accommodation; and (3) that such accommodation is reasonable
253
and does not impose an undue hardship on the employer. As Title
254
I is designed to prevent and remedy actual discrimination, the
employee must also show an adverse employment decision based on
255
their disability.

employer), with Davoll v. Webb, 194 F.3d 1116, 1131 (10th Cir. 1999) (recognizing
that, while “reassignment of an employee to a vacant position in a company is one of
a range of reasonable accommodations which must be considered . . . reassignment
might not always be a reasonable accommodation.”).
248. See Mears, 905 F. Supp. at 1081.
249. See Davoll, 194 F.3d at 1131 (10th Cir. 1999).
250. See discussion supra Part IV.B (addressing the conditions for a “qualified
individual” under Title I).
251. See discussion supra Part IV.B (relating “essential functions” to “qualified
individual”).
252. See discussion supra Part IV.C (defining what accommodations could be
“reasonable”).
253. See discussion supra Part IV.D (explaining the concept of “undue hardship” as
it relates to employers).
254. See EEOC Guidance, supra note 168 (providing background on the purpose
of the employment provisions in ADA Title I).
255. See Andrews v. Ohio, 104 F.3d 803, 808-10 (6th Cir.), reh’g denied, No. 95-3447,
1997 U.S. App. LEXIS (6th Cir. Feb. 21, 1997) (setting forth these criteria in regard
to a suit by highway patrol officers who claimed weight and fitness standards
implemented by Ohio were discriminatory in effect); accord Turco, 101 F.3d at 1093
(stating that an employee subject to termination due to repeated procedural and
safety lapses at a chemical manufacturing plant had to prove that his termination was
attributable to discrimination based on his diabetic condition, not safety or
performance concerns); Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 1996)
(holding that the extent of plaintiff’s disability following a heart attack and surgery
was a question that could properly be submitted to the jury, as was the question of
whether an employer took negative action against the employee based on this
condition); Aucutt v. Six Flags Over Mid-Am., Inc., 85 F.3d 1311, 1316 (8th Cir.
1996) (asserting that once the employer articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for terminating the plaintiff, the burden then shifts back to the terminated
employee to show that the stated reason(s) are actually a pretext); Bradley v.
Harcourt Brace & Co., 104 F.3d 267, 271-72 (9th Cir. 1996) (dismissing a terminated
employee’s ADA claim because of evidence of her poor performance prior to an
accident alleged to have caused her partial disability, and due to her testimony that
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For individuals with a mental illness, this final requirement
256
provides a “hook” into the employment-based protections in Title I.
An employer’s failure to provide equal mental health coverage for
257
258
certain individuals, and the repercussions of this failure, can be
construed as a violation of Title I’s reasonable accommodation
provisions. In essence, the individual employee obtains mental
259
health parity as a necessity of continued gainful employment,
260
forcing the employer to pay for such care.
Again, this is not the
sweeping change sought by mental health consumers and
261
advocates.
This approach does, however: (1) achieve equality in
262
health benefits for the individual worker; (2) establish mental
health parity as a viable and reasonable accommodation under Title

her disability began “when she was terminated”); Morisky v. Broward County, 80 F.3d
445, 448 (11th Cir. 1996) (finding against an illiterate plaintiff who claimed that the
failure of a test proctor to allow a counselor to read a test aloud to her was
discrimination based on her disability because the proctor and another personnel
employee had no knowledge of her alleged disability); Howard v. Navistar Int’l
Transp. Corp., 904 F. Supp. 922, 928 (E.D. Wis. 1995) (holding that an employee’s
tendinitis in his elbow did not constitute a disability for ADA purposes because the
tendinitis was not considered to “substantially limit a major life activity,” and that
adverse actions taken against him due to his inability to work machine shop tools
were not disability-based discrimination); Henry v. Guest Servs., Inc., 902 F. Supp.
245, 252 (D.D.C. 1995) (rejecting the notion that the provision of a cartoon making
light of depression was a sufficient adverse employment action to constitute
discrimination under the ADA).
256. See discussion infra Part IV.F (linking employment-based mental health
benefits and Title I).
257. See discussion infra Part IV.F (limiting Title I protection to the mentally ill
who wish to continue working, but are unable to do so without proper health
coverage).
258. See discussion supra Part IV.C (explaining how the employer’s obligation to
provide “reasonable accommodation” protects employees whose disability somehow
impedes their work performance).
259. See EEOC Guidance, supra note 168, at pt. 1630, app. (providing: “The ADA is
a federal antidiscrimination statute designed to remove barriers which prevent
qualified individuals with disabilities from enjoying the same employment
opportunities that are available to persons without disabilities.”).
260. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (1994), supra note 203 (defining “[r]easonable
accommodation”).
[M]aking existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and
useable by individuals with disabilities; and . . . job restructuring, part-time or
modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or
modification of existing equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or
modifications of examinations, training materials, or policies, the provision
of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for
individuals with disabilities.
Id.
261. See discussion supra Part I.A-C (covering state and federal legislative efforts to
broadly prohibit unequal treatment for mental illness, making them illegal for all
beneficiaries in employer-sponsored plans); id. at Part III (detailing court cases
challenging such unequal benefits).
262. See discussion infra Part IV.F (explaining how the ADA could be used as a
means to supplement mental health benefits under existing health coverage).
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263

I; and (3) prove that individuals with a mental illness can continue
264
to work and lead “normal” lives if given adequate health care. The
following section describes a hypothetical real-world scenario
adhering to Title I requirements, and demonstrates how the refusal
to accommodate an employee’s mental illness through providing
265
mental health parity becomes impermissible discrimination.
F.

Applying Reasonable Accommodation to Unequal Mental Health Benefits

One of the primary goals of the ADA is to encourage the disabled
266
to work.
By framing mental health parity as a “pro-employment”
267
measure, Title I protections can be applied to employees with
mental illnesses who receive lesser medical care from their employer
268
as a consequence of the classification of their illness.
In the
following scenario, the case for mental health parity is less about the
269
injustice and/or impropriety of the mental/physical distinction, but
more about the practical effects of unequal health coverage in an
every-day, work-based setting.
270
An employee with manic-depression/bi-polar disorder works for
271
a corporation.
The employee, who controls the illness with
272
medication and regular doctor visits, is a productive employee. The

263. See id.
264. See Domenici Statement, supra note 10, at 3002 (asserting that by providing
the mentally ill with the necessary treatment, they can continue to work, and will no
longer be imprisoned or pushed to the “margins of society”).
265. See discussion infra Part IV.F (discussing how the employment-based
protections in Title I of the ADA protect an employee with a mental illness who
exhausts coverage under the employer-sponsored health plan).
266. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1) (1994) (banning job discrimination against
disabled employees); see also H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, supra note 245, at 31 (stating that
“[t]he underlying premise of [Title I] is that persons with disabilities should not be
excluded from job opportunities”).
267. See discussion infra Part IV.F (connecting the provision of parity benefits to
an employee’s desire to continue working).
268. See Bee & Gibson, supra note 6 (detailing common inequalities in health care
coverage between physical and mental illnesses).
269. See Hyman Testimony, supra note 36 (describing medical evidence that
demonstrated many mental illnesses are attributable to physiological conditions in
the brain, making the physical/mental distinction invalid).
270. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000) (defining disability as “a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities or such
individual . . . a record of such impairment . . . [or] being regarded as have such an
impairment.”); see also Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999) (“The Act
defines a ‘disability’ as ‘a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one
or more of the major life activities’ of the individual.”) (emphasis in original).
271. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B)(iii) (1994) (including size and overall financial
resources of the employer as considerations in determining whether the requested
accommodation is “reasonable”).
272. See Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir.
2000) (holding in concert with six other circuits that a “qualified individual” must be
able to perform the “essential functions” of the position to have standing under the
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employee receives health care benefits through an employer273
which caps annual and lifetime
sponsored health plan,
274
expenditures for mental illness at a certain amount, but does not
275
cap expenditures for physical illness. The employee exhausts either
276
yearly coverage or aggregate lifetime benefits under the plan. The
employee notifies both the boss and the human resources
277
department of the illness
and the exhausted health benefits
situation, and requests assistance in purchasing a supplemental
278
plan, which would provide benefits in parity with those provided for
279
physical illness. The company refuses. Over the next few months,
the employee’s illness worsens without proper medication or
treatment, which interferes with job performance, such as interacting
280
constructively with fellow employees and supervisors,
and
281
As a result of this
completing required tasks in a timely manner.
282
diminished performance, the employee is fired.
The employee
brings suit under Title I of the ADA on the basis of this dismissal.
The complaint states that: (1) the company’s refusal to assist with the
purchase the extended benefit was a refusal to make a “reasonable
283
accommodation;” (2) that this failure exacerbated the mental

ADA).
273. See Bee & Gibson, supra note 6 (indicating that almost all employers who
offer health insurance under employer-sponsored health plans include some mental
health care benefits).
274. See id. (reporting that the median lifetime limit for mental health care
spending in an employee-sponsored health plan is $40,000).
275. See id. (observing that health benefits for “physical” ailments typically provide
far more money for treatment).
276. See Libertoff Testimony, supra note 1, at 1 (providing an example of an
individual confronting such limits).
277. See Vorhies v. Pioneer Mfg. Co., 906 F. Supp. 578, 581-82 (D. Colo. 1995)
(requiring a person with a disability to notify superiors of such disability before being
able to pursue a claim that they failed to accommodate it).
278. See id. (requiring that an employee requesting an accommodation must
demonstrate that it is workable, reasonable, and effective).
279. See id.
280. See Reed v. Lepage Bakeries, Inc., 102 F. Supp. 2d 33, 38 (D. Me. 2000)
(concerning an employee who could not constructively interact with other
employees and supervisors).
281. See Horton v. Bd. of Trs. of Cmty. Coll. Dist. No. 508, No. 95-C-2346, 1996
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6879 (N.D. Ill. 1996), aff’d, 1997 U.S. App. Lexis 2470 (7th Cir.
1997); accord Teahan v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 80 F.3d 50, 54 (2d Cir. 1996);
Rogers v. Int’l Marine Terminals, 87 F.3d 755, 757 (5th Cir. 1996); Kinkead v.
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 49 F.3d 454, 456 (8th Cir. 1995); Tydnall v. Nat’l Educ.
Ctrs., 31 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 1994); Lewis v. Zilog, Inc., 908 F. Supp. 931, 946
(N.D. Ga. 1995); Vorhies, 906 F. Supp. at 581.
282. See Bradley v. Harcourt Brace & Co., 104 F.3d 267, 271-72 (9th Cir. 1996)
(dismissing a terminated employee’s ADA claim due, in part, to her testimony that
her disability began “when she was terminated”).
283. See discussion supra Part IV.C (covering requirements of “reasonable
accommodation”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (1994); supra note 203 (defining
“[r]easonable accommodation.”).
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284

illness, which in turn negatively effect job performance; and
(3) therefore the termination was inextricably linked to the illness
285
and the mental disability.
In this hypothetical case, the plaintiff adheres to the “road map” of
an ADA Title I claim: (1) a disability limiting major life function
286
(broad “ability to work”); (2) a willingness to perform job duties (is
287
(3) the employee notified the
not claiming total disability);
employer of the disability and requested an accommodation (the
288
request for supplemental coverage); (4) the employer refused the
289
accommodation; and (5) consequently was subject to an adverse
290
employment action due to the disability (employee was fired).
Although the ADA provides several affirmative defenses to
291
“reasonable accommodation” requests, it does not appear that any
of them are applicable in the foregoing scenario. The employer may
claim that the employee’s requested accommodation is unreasonable
292
and poses an undue hardship on the employer. If the employer is

284. See discussion supra Part IV.E (establishing that, for the purposes of a prima
facia Title I claim, an employee must actually suffer an adverse employment decision
based on the disability to qualify for relief).
285. See discussion supra Part IV.B (providing examples of when an employer did
or did not make a reasonable accommodation for an employee). In situations where
the employee could not establish a linkage between his or her disability and
termination, courts routinely dismissed charges. See Kotlowski v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
922 F. Supp. 790, 800 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding former employee did not rebut
employer’s evidence that employee’s performance inadequacies were the real reason
for being laid off); Johnson v. Children’s Hosp., No. Civ.A 94-5698, 1995 WL 338497,
at *2 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
286. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491 (requiring, “at a minimum,” that the plaintiff
“allege [an inability] to work in a broad class of jobs”).
287. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994) (defining qualified individual); Weyer v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 2000) (surveying
prior court decisions on what constitutes a “qualified individual” for the purposes of
ADA Title I standing).
288. See Vorhies v. Pioneer Mfg. Co., 906 F. Supp. 578, 581-82 (D. Colo. 1995)
(finding against an employee who failed to request an accommodation for a back
problem); accord Voytek v. Univ. of Cal., No. C-92-3465EFL, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12453 (N.D. Cal. 1994), aff’d mem. 77 F.3d 491 (9th Cir. 1996) (unpublished
opinion) (holding that an employer is not required to accommodate for an
unknown disability).
289. Compare Stewart v. Brown County, 86 F.3d 107, 112 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding
that the county made reasonable accommodations, and that the statute does not
require employers to find a “perfect cure for the problem”), with James v. Frank, 772
F. Supp. 984 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (providing injunctive relief because of the postal
service’s “inexcusable” practice of failing to accommodate employee’s physical
handicap).
290. See Vorhies, 906 F. Supp at 581-82; see also discussion supra Part IV.E (providing
the requirement of an adverse employment decision for a Title I claim).
291. See discussion infra Part IV.F (detailing potential employer defenses,
including “undue burden” and the insurer “safe harbor”).
292. See discussion supra Part IV.D (including the factors to be considered when
determining whether an accommodation poses an undue hardship).
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293

small or has limited financial resources, this financial argument
294
may be persuasive. However, in cases where the employer is not so
situated, size, profitability and other “balance sheet” factors would
work to the employee’s advantage when determining the employer’s
295
relative burden.
Similarly, because the accommodation requested
is primarily external to the actual workplace (i.e. more
comprehensive health coverage to be accessed elsewhere), the
accommodation would not be intrusive on the actual day-to-day
296
functioning of the business, and would neither create more work
297
nor impinge on management’s oversight of the
for others
298
Subsequently, the requested accommodation does not
employee.
appear on its face unreasonable or unduly burdensome under the
299
reasoning of prior courts.
Additionally, the employer may assert the ADA’s “safe harbor”
300
defense. The “safe harbor” provision allows insurers to classify and

293. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, supra note 245, at 40-42 (explaining the Judiciary
Committee’s intent not to jeopardize the success of viability of enterprises with
limited resources).
294. See id. at 39-42 (stating that “[o]nly those accommodations which would
require significant difficulty or expense when considered in light of the size,
resources and structure of the employer would be considered an undue hardship.”).
295. See Lyons v. Legal Aid Soc’y, 68 F.3d 1512, 1516-17 (2d Cir. 1995) (listing
what factors need to be examined in determining employer’s burden). The court
stated that:
The question of whether it is reasonable to require an employer to provide
[an accommodation] may well be susceptible to different answers . . .
[requiring] ‘common-sense balancing of the costs and benefits’ to both the
employer and the employee . . . [and] an accommodation may not be
considered unreasonable merely because it requires the employer to ‘assume
more than a de minimis cost’
Id. (quoting Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 138 n.3, 140 (2d Cir.
1995)).
296. See Henderson v. N.Y. Life, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 527, 540-41 (N.D. Tex. 1997)
(finding that allowing an employee to work at home would deprive NYL of
supervision and would be disruptive to other employees); see also 42 U.S.C. §
12111(10) (1994) (including “the impact . . . of such accommodation upon the
operation of the facility” as a factor to consider when determining “undue
hardship”).
297. See id. (stating that the ADA does not require any accommodation that would
require other employees to work harder or for longer hours).
298. See id. (holding that a valid reason for denying any accommodation was that it
deprived NYL of the ability to supervise employee’s work).
299. See discussion supra Part IV.D (explaining the application of the “undue
hardship” defense).
300. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
[Titles I through III] shall not be construed to prohibit or restrict—(1) an
insurer . . . or any agent, or entity that administers benefit plans, or similar
organizations from underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such
risks that are based on or not inconsistent with State law; or (2) a person or
organization covered by this chapter from establishing, sponsoring,
observing or administering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan that are
based on underwriting risks classifying risks, or administering such risks that
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adjust risks according to traditional industry practices. Presumably,
the employer could claim that the differential coverage for mental
illness was a valid and allowed distinction based on actuarial data and
302
common risk adjustment assumptions.
In a reasonable
accommodation claim, however, the employee is not seeking a
blanket condemnation of the underlying benefit structure, but is
merely seeking an individualized remedy to its effect. Consequently,
the employee avoids arguments about the validity of the actuarial and
risk adjustment assumptions contained within the plan, thereby
removing the “safe harbor” provision from the calculus of the
303
requested accommodation.
In sum, the employee in the foregoing hypothetical framed the
issue of unequal coverage for mental illness as impairing his or her
304
The employee thus finds a
continuing ability and desire to work.
“back door” into Title I of the ADA for mental health parity, avoiding
305
both the statutory defenses, and the courts’ reluctance to declare
306
unequal coverage discriminatory under the ADA.
CONCLUSION
Though progress toward equal treatment for Americans with a
307
mental illness has been difficult, opportunities to achieve parity do

are based on or not inconsistent with State law. . . .
Id.
301. See Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1116 (stating that “[b]y putting an insurance company
‘safe harbor’ in the Act, Congress gained such freedom of choice for policy
purchasers and efficiencies for insurers as might accrue if insurance companies were
free to decide whether to cover and to what extent to cover various disabilities.”).
302. See id. (stating the rationale for risk adjustment for mental illnesses).
The coverage of mental disability and physical disability involves different
risks with different hazards or exposure . . . [we are advised] that research
shows that policies that do not place a limit on the duration of benefits [for
mental illness] receive nearly double the percentage of mental disorder
claims as policies with such limits.
Id.
303. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.16(f) (2000) (requiring that decisions not based on
risk classifications must be made in conformity with Title I of the ADA); see also
Esfahani v. Med. Coll., 919 F. Supp. 832, 836 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (holding that although
diagnosis-based distinctions in the administration of long-term disability plans are
permissible under the ADA, distinctions providing lesser benefits for mental illness
than for physical illness do not fall within the protection of the law if they are
“arbitrary, discriminatory or without scientific basis”).
304. See discussion supra Part IV.A (linking the protections in Title I of the ADA to
employment situations).
305. See discussion supra Part IV.D (providing defense of “undue hardship”); see
also 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (1994) (containing the statutory “safe harbor” defense).
306. See discussion supra Part III (surveying court decisions declining to require
mental health parity under the ADA).
307. See discussion supra Parts I and III (explaining legislative and legal
impediments to equal health care coverage).
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308

exist. Legislatively, one could certainly view the sunset date of the
309
MHPA as a backward step, but it could also be viewed as a chance to
again galvanize the mental health community and draw national
310
311
attention to the matter. Since passage of the 1996 MHPA, more
312
information on the cost of “parity coverage” has been gathered,
helping substantiate claims that such coverage is not prohibitively
313
However, changes in benefit structures in the wake of
expensive.
314
should not be discounted.
Rather, such
the 1996 MHPA
information could effectively be used in advocating for the passage of
315
S. 543 in the 107th Congress. Due to Congress’ reluctance to pass a
316
and real concerns about the
“wide open” parity provision,
unintended consequences of parity in the voluntary health care
317
market, a more controlled, targeted approach to parity should be
318
319
This approach is embodied in S. 543, which both
the goal.

308. See id. (advocating for separate, but complimentary legislative and litigationbased approaches to achieving equal treatment for mental illness).
309. See 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(f) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (“This section shall not
apply to benefits for services furnished on or after September 30, 2001.”).
310. See 147 CONG. REC. S2393 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 2001) (statement of Sen.
Domenici) (“The introduction of our Bill marks a historic opportunity for us to take
the next step towards mental health parity. The timing of our Bill is even more
important because the landmark Mental Health Parity Act of 1996 will sunset on
September 30 of this year.”).
311. See 29 U.S.C. § 1185a (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
312. See GAO Letter Report, supra note 14, at 16 (finding that only three percent
of surveyed employers reported increases in claims costs pursuant to their
compliance with the 1996 MHPA).
313. See id.
314. See id. at 16 (stating that employers implementing the requirements of the
1996 MHPA also responded by “tightening other design features” in order to control
costs and utilization).
315. See 147 CONG. REC. S2395 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 2001) (statement of Sen.
Wellstone).
Since the Mental Health Parity Act became law, we have seen that the costs
have remained low and manageable, but, unfortunately, we have also seen
that employers and insurance companies have taken advantage of the gaps
that remain in coverage for mental illness. Patients have faced increases in
copayment and deduction costs, more problems in gaining access to care,
fewer approvals for hospital stays and outpatient days, and refusals to cover
care. The suffering of people with mental illness has grown, and the time to
end this discrimination is now.
Id.
316. See Dole Statement, supra note 98 (remarking “the [Domenici/Wellstone
Amendment is] a very, very expensive provision, and it’s going to cause all kinds of
problems”).
317. See Rosen Testimony, supra note 100 (estimating that each one percent
increase in insurance costs results in 200,000 to 300,000 fewer covered lives).
318. See discussion supra Part II.B (demonstrating that parity coverage can be
introduced, without an upward spike in costs, if done so in conjunction with benefit
and utilization management).
319. See discussion supra Part II.A-D.
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requires full parity for medically-necessary services and allows
321
insurers some flexibility in benefit design to allay their fears of
322
increased costs and utilization.
Federal courts have shown the same reluctance to implement
parity when considering challenges to unequal health care coverage
323
brought under the ADA.
In light of such decisions, it is time to
324
Specifically,
consider a less-sweeping, individualized approach.
future court challenges to unequal coverage for mental illness should
focus on how such coverage affects an individual’s ability to maintain
325
gainful employment.
Under this approach, mental health parity
becomes a “reasonable accommodation” for an individual with a
mental illness, requiring the employer to provide parity in order to
comply with ADA Title I protections. While this approach lacks the
broad-based, remedial effect of declaring unequal benefits
presumptively discriminatory, it provides real, necessary relief for
326
individuals suffering from a mental illness.
Whether combining these strategies or pursuing them separately,
the goals should be to protect those most in need of treatment, and
327
to build critical mass behind the push for mental health parity.
Although the change sought in either case may not be the “seismic”
shift many mental health advocates and consumers desire, such
changes: (1) provide real relief to individuals with a mental illness;

320. See The Mental Health Equitable Treatment Act of 2001, S. 543, 107th Cong.
§ 2705(e)(3) (2001) (providing parity for services “included as part of an authorized
treatment plan that is in accordance with standard protocols and such services meet
applicable medical necessity criteria”).
321. See id. § 2705 (providing that “coverage shall not impose any treatment
limitations of financial requirements with respect to the coverage of benefits for
mental illness unless comparable treatment limitations or financial requirements are
imposed on medical and surgical benefits”).
322. See discussion supra Part I.D (referencing opposition to parity based on fear
of escalating costs).
323. See discussion supra Part III (surveying numerous judicial decisions declining
to extend ADA protections to unequal mental health coverage).
324. See discussion supra Part IV.F (establishing the parameters of an
individualized Title I approach).
325. See id.
326. See id. (asserting that this individualized parity coverage would provide
tangible benefit to an individuals who exhaust their non-parity, employer-sponsored
coverage).
327. See 147 CONG. REC. S2395 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 2001) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy).
As we have learned more about the brain and the way it works, we have
developed promising treatments that can significantly improve the health of
individuals with mental illness and help them lead productive lives. Success
rates for treating mental illness are now as high as 80 percent. Without
strong parity legislation, however, these effective treatments will remain
elusive for the millions of individuals who need them.
Id.
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(2) continue to provide important cost data and societal experience,
helping further discredit current, well-established resistance to
mental health parity; and (3) move the law closer to the overall goal
of complete and equal treatment for all Americans suffering from a
mental illness.

